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ABSTRACT
When a patent expires, innovator (brand-name) drugs lose their monopoly status and new
generic competitors are free to enter the market. Theoretically, free market entry and exit
should lead to a drop in the price of the innovator drug as per the tenets of perfect
competition. Yet instead of prices decreasing, innovator drug prices are often minimally
impacted by generic competition and the innovator continues to maintain both market power
and market share – a phenomenon labelled the generic competitor paradox (Scherer, 1993)
That the expected supply and demand dynamic is less pronounced in multisource drug
markets, suggests that non-price considerations influence purchasing behaviour in
multisource prescription drug markets. This dissertation focuses on the marketing theory of
brand equity to rationalise the non-price competitive advantages that established
prescription innovator (brand-name) drugs have over newer bioequivalent generic entrants.
By analysing the prescribing habits of physicians, we find that brand equity confers a

competitive advantage to the innovator drug: Brand equity is cultivated during the period of
patent granted monopoly and creates a first-mover market advantage that is reinforced by
the strategic creation of brand loyalty, which serves as a barrier to entry for generic
substitutes.
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BACKGROUND
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
DRUG MONOPOLIES AND THE TRANSITION TO MULTISOURCE DRUG COMPETITION
Drug patents filed in the United States since 1995 last for 20 years from the date of patent
application filing (Hunt, 2000). Filing a patent claims proprietorship over the invention of a
chemical formula found to have some therapeutic utility. However, receiving a patent is but one
step in the process that may eventually lead to the commercial marketing of a drug. The
innovator1 drug must undergo a series of laboratory and clinical trials to determine safety and
efficacy and be approved by the Food Drug Administration (FDA) before it can appear on the
market (Statman, 1981). Due to the length and stringency of this drug approval process, nearly
half the years of patent protection are lost. By one estimate, the number of years remaining on
an innovator drug patent after FDA approval - the effective patent life- ranges from 7 to 12 years
(Grabowski & Vernon, 1996; Grabowski, Long, & Mortimer, 2014). Hence innovating firms must
face significant sunk costs to apply for approval prior to knowing the competitive landscape of
the post-patent market (Reiffen & Ward, 2005) Accordingly, the innovator firm must determine
if the expected post-entry rents justify the economic and opportunity costs associated with FDA
application (Reiffen & Ward, 2005).
Through the lens of public health policy, the drug patent system is intended to strike a
balance between rewarding innovation and maximising social benefit (Ellison & Ellison, 2011).
Patents erect a competitive barrier to market entry that permits both market exclusivity and

1

An innovator or brand drug is the first drug created containing its specific active ingredient to receive approval for
use. It is usually the product for which efficacy, safety and quality have been fully established. When a new drug is
first made, drug patents usually will be acquired by the founding company.
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pricing above marginal cost. This transient monopoly is beneficial to innovating firms wishing to
recoup the costs of R&D and to maximise profit (Ellison & Ellison, 2011). Yet the opportunity cost
of rewarding innovation through patent protections is diminished social benefit. Setting aside
the influence of third-party payers, the costs associated with drug patent monopolies may limit
patient choice and thus be detrimental to affordable drug access and social welfare (McAffee,
Mialon, & Williams, 2004). Subsequently, the rationale posited by policy makers and generic
entrants alike is that by eventually expiring patents, a vibrant and competitive generic market is
created that ensures that affordable medications are widely available at prices that reflect the
marginal costs of production (McAffee et al., 2004). Social benefit is maximised by the removal
of the cost barrier to accessing pharmaceutical healthcare options (Boldrin & Levine, 2008;
McAffee et al., 2004).
A generic drug can only be marketed once the innovator drug’s patent has expired. Prior
to 1984, any firm that wanted to market a post-patent expiration generic undertook a similar
application process (Hellerstein, 1998). Although a generic competitor did not incur the cost of
determining which drugs were technically feasible and economically viable, it still faced the
hurdle of demonstrating efficacy and safety by conducting the same tests required of the
innovator incumbent (Hellerstein, 1998; Reiffen & Ward, 2005). This lengthy approval process
constituted a substantial barrier to entry for many generic drugs, as a result of which the generic
market was relatively undeveloped (Hellerstein, 1994; Hellerstein, 1998).
The 1984 passage of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
generally referred to as the Hatch-Waxman Act, reduced the regulatory burden on generic
manufacturers (Hellerstein, 1998; Reiffen & Ward, 2005). This landmark legislation stipulates that
2

generic entrants need only demonstrate bioequivalence2 to the innovator drug already approved
by the FDA (Reiffen & Ward, 2005). By streamlining and abbreviating the regulatory process, the
cost of bringing a generic to market was diminished (Hellerstein, 1994; Hellerstein, 1998; Reiffen
& Ward, 2005).
The Hatch-Waxman act was a legislative compromise that sought to balance incentives
for innovation against issues of access and affordability (Berndt & Aitken, 2011). Hatch-Waxman
expedited the approval process for generic prescription drugs, which spurred immediate growth
in the generic drug industry as many branded innovator drugs went off patent and cost
containment efforts encouraged consumers to switch to more affordable generic alternatives
(Grabowski & Vernon, 1996; Hunt, 2000). The generic share of retail prescriptions in the United
States has grown from 18.6% in 1984 (Berndt & Aitken, 2011) to 89% in 2017(Steven M
Lieberman, Margaret Darling, & Paul B Ginsburg, 2017). Conversely, Hatch-Waxman conferred
certain benefits to patented originator drugs. For example, the policy extended the effective
patent life of innovator drugs by restoring the patent life “lost” during the clinical testing and FDA
review period for innovator branded drugs (Hunt, 2000). Ten years after implementing the policy,
the average effective patent life of new compounds was 11.8 years, 2.3 years longer than the
9.5-year period applicable to a drug without Waxman-Hatch extensions (Grabowski & Vernon,
1996; Hunt, 2000).

2

Bioequivalence: the property wherein two drugs with identical active ingredients or two different dosage forms
of the same drug possess similar bioavailability and produce the same effect at the site of physiological activity.
(Miriam Webster)
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STRATEGIC ENTRY DETTERENCE AND THE BEHAVIOUR OF MARKET STAKEHOLDERS
To both recoup the costs of drug development and profit from a protected monopoly,
innovating firms are incentivised to extend the life of patents. A common tactic is to file several
secondary patents on the same drug to extend the 20-year period and impede market entry of
generic competitors (Vokinger, Kesselheim, Avorn, & Sarpatwari, 2017). Another strategy is to
prolong a drug patent through research on children. Any drug proposed for use in minors is
automatically granted a 6-month extension (Bhat, 2005). Known as the paediatric exclusivity
extension, this loophole can only be used twice. Additionally, some innovating firms will
manufacture modified versions of the originator drug – a strategy known as “evergreening”
(Collier, 2013). Slight alterations may be made to the original drug formula. For example, the
new drug might rework the administration or dosage of the drug resulting in an extended -release
formula or a rapid release formula (Collier, 2013).Though evergreening will require another
patent application and clinical trials, it effectively deters the competition from producing a
generic substitute, unless the FDA determines that the original innovator drug is of the same
quality as the revised version(Bhat, 2005; Collier, 2013; Vokinger et al., 2017) .
Beyond patent extension, innovating pharmaceutical firms execute a range of legal
manoeuvres to both extend their monopoly and deter competitors. Reverse payment patent
settlements, also known as "pay-for-delay" agreements involve the innovating pharmaceutical
firm compensating one or more potential generic challengers to delay their entry into the market
(Fialkoff, 2013). These settlements have been criticised as anti- competitive and counter to the
public interest principally because they frustrate the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act - to
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increase competition and promote access to affordable pharmaceuticals alternatives (Fialkoff,
2013). In 2013, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Trade Commission could
sue patent holders for potential anti-trust violations for engaging in these agreements (New York
Times, 2013). Though reverse-payment settlements are today less ubiquitous, they now often
involve convoluted arrangements intended to conceal payment (Vokinger et al., 2017).
In addition to legal recourse, innovator drug manufacturers will engage in other means of
strategic entry deterrence. One ploy involves an innovating firm implementing restricted
distribution arrangements to thwart generic developers from acquiring innovator drug samples
thus hindering potential rivals from completing FDA-mandated bioequivalence testing (Vokinger
et al., 2017). Innovator brand drug manufacturers also file frivolous petitions with the FDA to
delay generic drug approvals (Balto, 2018). Typical petitions contend that the FDA’s normal
bioequivalence comparison method is ineffectual, and that approval of the generic application
should be deferred pending further testing (Vokinger et al., 2017). Between 2013 and 2015, the
FDA received 67 such petitions but approved only three (Vokinger et al., 2017).
THE PIONEER ADVANTAGE OF PATENTS
Indubitably, the market power enjoyed by individual innovator drugs derives primarily
from the intentional grant of patents to allow pricing above marginal cost (Ellison & Ellison, 2011).
When a patent expires, innovator drugs lose their monopoly status and new generic competitors
are free to enter the market. Accordingly, the expiration of a pharmaceutical patent, and the
subsequent opening of a drug market to potential entrants, is a momentous event for both the
pharmaceutical firm and its competitors. Theoretically, free market entry and exit should lead to

5

a drop in the price of the innovator drug as per the tenets of perfect competition. Subsequently,
the conventional wisdom is that the price of a patented pharmaceutical drug will often decline
significantly once the drug switches to off-patent status due to the entry of generic drugs
(McAffee et al., 2004). This notion is affirmed by well-publicised scenarios such as when the
medication Lipitor - the most popular brand of cholesterol-lowering drugs and once the topselling branded drug in the world - lost its patent rights in late 2011. This led to a 50% decrease
of net income for Pfizer Inc. in the fourth fiscal quarter 2011 compared to the same period in
2010 (Forbes, February 2013; (Chao, Hu, Zhang, & Wu, 2016) ).
Contrary to the trend of decreasing innovator drug prices with increased competition, is
the observation that innovator brand-name drug prices are either sustained or increased upon
generic market entry. Furthermore, innovator pharmaceutical companies continue to maintain
an unexpected degree of market power– a phenomenon labelled the generic competitor paradox
(Kanavos, 2008; Regan, 2008). Most innovator brand-name medications maintain large market
shares upon patent expiration despite intense competition by bioequivalent generics and policies
favouring generic market entry such as the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 (Lundin, 2000). Regan
(2008) offers an independent test of the relationship between patent expiration and prescription
drug prices.

They identify an average $20 differential between innovator and generic

prescriptions in a multisource drug market. Overall, each generic entrant is associated with an
average 1% increase in the price of a branded prescription. The price differential between
innovator and generic substitute grows with entry as the innovator price rises and the generic
price falls (Regan, 2008).This incongruity is compounded by empirical evidence indicating that
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R&D-based drug manufacturers do not attempt to deter generic entry through their pricing
strategies, which remain above generic substitutes (Kanavos, 2008).
BRAND EQUITY AND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE GENERIC COMPETITOR PARADOX
On this line of reasoning, the generic competitor paradox may be construed as the
outcome of non-price considerations in the prescribing (and consequently purchasing) of
innovator drugs. This dissertation focuses on the marketing theory of brand equity to rationalise
the competitive advantage that established brand-name drugs have over newer generic entrants.
Brand equity is a term used in consumer marketing theory to describe the incremental utility or
value added to a product by its name (Aaker, 1992; Keller, 1993; Yoo, Donthu, & Lee, 2000).
Accordingly, brand equity can be estimated by subtracting the utility of physical attributes of the
product from the total utility of a brand (Yoo & Donthu, 2001). The central premise of this
dissertation is that brand equity is critically important for physician prescribers to make
subjective and experiential points of differentiation between innovator drugs and their generic
alternatives. Notably, these perceived differences in quality between an innovator drug and
generic substitute exist despite objective bioequivalence evidence to the contrary. We propose
that in the larger marketplace, entirely subjective experiential and information differences
between an innovator incumbent and generic entrant signal brand equity.
Authors like Aaker and Keller have illustrated the process by which brand equity is built
(Aaker, 1991; Aaker, 1992; Aaker, 1996; Keller, 2001; Keller & Lehmann, 2006) . Both theories
have been subject to rigorous psychometric testing in a variety of consumer goods categories,
though conspicuously less so within the pharmaceutical industry. Nonetheless, it can be argued
7

that the process of building brand equity within other product categories is applicable to the
marketing of pharmaceuticals. However, a marked distinction in the dispensing of
pharmaceuticals is the delegation of decision-making from the patient (principal) to the physician
prescriber – rendering the latter both gatekeeper and agent. Due to this principal-agent
arrangement, prescriber practices - in lieu of patient purchasing decisions - are essential to
investigating the influence of brand equity in the multisource drug market.
At the outset, it should be reiterated that consumer-based brand equity is a psychological
construct. Owing to the principal-agent structure of healthcare decisions, the corresponding
terminology as it pertains to drug selection we have dubbed “physician-based brand equity”.
Though subjective in nature, the inherent value of building brand equity is nonetheless
objectively measurable in pricing strategies and revenue streams. If the tenets of brand equity
theory are applicable to the pharmaceutical context, a well marketed brand-name drug is more
easily recognised, memorable, and perceived to be of higher quality than its competitors (Keller,
1993). Consequently, strong brands represent a set of distinctive characteristics and benefits, the
net impact of which is the belief on the part of prescribers that the brand or innovator drug is
superior to generic alternatives (Farjam & Hongyi, 2015). In accordance with Aaker’s (1991) and
Keller’s (1993) conceptualisation of brand equity, differences in perceived quality of the
innovator brand drug versus generic alternatives should develop into a positive attitude towards
the branded drug, which in turn fosters a differential response in prescription rates as attitudinal
loyalty to the brand morphs into behavioural brand loyalty.
Notably, brand loyalty may itself be a conscious or unconscious driver of prescription
decisions. Nevertheless, the implications of brand loyalty are such that the pharmaceutical
8

manufacturer can set the prices of a branded drug with substantial name recognition, over and
above the prices set by less familiar bioequivalent competitors, and the equilibrium market price
dictated by perfect competition. Indeed, the value of branding and extensive marketing to a
pharmaceutical firm, is the ability to create perceived differentiation of a drug despite
therapeutic equivalency and indistinguishable safety and effectiveness profiles. The ability to
subjectively differentiate the branded drug from its competitors permits the pharmaceutical firm
to exercise a degree of control over prices, in a manner characteristic of monopolistic
competition. The result is increased revenue and increased value – equity – of the branded drug
(Blackett & Robins, 2001; Pradhan & Misra, 2014). Succinctly stated, cultivating brand equity
involves product differentiation, which lends itself to pricing flexibility and increased revenues.
Such a degree of market power would explain the sustained high prices of branded innovator
drugs despite competition from viable and cheaper generic substitutes (Farjam & Hongyi, 2015;
Mack, 2007). Therefore, if brand equity theory is equally applicable to the pharmaceutical
context, any perceived product differentiation resultant of branding efforts lends the innovator
a competitive advantage over generic entrants (Mack, 2007) such that there is a willingness to
pay price premiums (Keller 1993), for a drug that is perceived to be a more superior alternative.
Various psychometric analyses of the relationship between brand loyalty and brand
equity indicate a bi-directional relationship, with either dimension augmenting the other(Aaker,
2009; Farjam & Hongyi, 2015; Tuominen, 1999). Cultivated brand equity is self-sustaining – not
only is it the result of brand loyalty but itself engenders further brand loyalty (Erdem & Swait,
1998). The marketing literature in other product categories establishes that high brand equity is
tantamount to trust and confidence in the brand, which consistently appear in numerous
9

validated second order and third order confirmatory factor analyses as influential contributors
to brand loyalty (Yoo et al., 2000; Yoo & Donthu, 2001). Brand equity reduces the anticipated
risk, enhances anticipated confidence in the brand selection decision, and increases satisfaction
with the brand (Broyles, Schumann, & Leingpibul, 2009).
As aforementioned, market exclusivity and monopoly status guaranteed by patent
protections are intended to recoup costs (Mack, 2007). Yet from the perspective of building
brand equity, an additional hypothesis is that a long period of market exclusivity guarantees the
innovator brand drug a head start or first-mover advantage with which to build brand loyalty
and equity to the detriment of ensuing generic competitors (Macit, Taner, Mercanoglu, &
Mercanoglu, 2016). Cultivating the brand equity of a patented drug creates a momentum in
demand during the years of market exclusivity that continues upon patent expiration and
consequent entry of generic competitors(Blackett & Robins, 2001).
Time plays an important role in our analysis. We hypothesise that time is important in
innovator brand equity cultivation. Hypothetically, the longer an innovator drug has a monopoly
on the market, the greater the competitive head start to cycle through the stages of brand equity
- from initial knowledge about the drug to intransigent brand loyalty or habit persistence. Habit
persistence is the tendency of the physician to prescribe the same version of a drug to all patients
regardless of their individual patient profiles. Conversely, we hypothesise that generic drugs also
incur a process of time-dependent information infusion and physician learning before achieving
acceptance among physician prescribers. If such physicians learn about generic alternatives and
update their preferences, this would be indicative of switching behaviour. The crux of our
analysis is determining which factors (patient, physician, drug, and market characteristics), tilt
10

the balance towards the innovator drug, such as habit persistence, versus which factors
encourage physician learning and switching behaviour towards generic alternatives.
To recapitulate, brand equity is both a monetary and qualitative construct. As a financial
construct, brand equity is represented by the price premium patients are willing to pay for an
innovator drug over and above that of the bioequivalent generic. As a qualitative construct,
brand equity represents a gradation of superlative, yet subjective characteristics possessed by
the innovator drug versus its generic substitutes. According to Aaker, these psychological
attributes include greater awareness and knowledge of the innovator drug, positive associations
with the innovator brand, and perceived quality of the innovator drug (often viewed as superior
to the bioequivalent generic substitute). The result of this continuum of attitudinal change is
brand loyalty to the innovator, a psychological attribute that can be quantitatively assessed by
calculating the likelihood of prescribing the innovator drug over its generic successor. Given these
monetary and qualitative descriptors, our analysis incorporates several indicators of brand
equity: 1)brand equity is quantified by the price premium of an innovator drug , which physicians
are willing to tolerate; 2) brand equity is evidenced by habit persistence and brand loyalty, that
is, the likelihood of prescribing an innovator drug in a multisource drug market; and 3) Brand
equity is defined as the perceived consensus quality differential or information differential
between an innovator drug and generic substitutes.
THE IMPACT OF AGENCY AND INSURANCE STATUS ON BRAND PREFERENCES
Due to the asymmetric information problem in healthcare, whereby the physician holds
greater knowledge about diseases, diagnostics and therapies, the physician must act as the agent
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for the patient in medical decision making. Yet the physician is also an agent of the financier of
health care (including third party payers such as insurance companies and government) and has
a professional obligation to only provide medically necessary services. In this scenario, we
assume that both the (indirect) utility of the patient and the insurance expenditures enter the
utility function of the physician (Crea, Galizzi, Linnosmaa, & Miraldo, 2019). As a dual agent, the
physician internalises a share of the patient’s utility in their own utility function, but also a share
of the drug costs covered by the insurer (Crea et al., 2019). The predicament of perfect physician
agency is to strike the correct balance between fulfilling the needs and desires of the patient
while pursuing only those therapies or interventions deemed medically necessary (Nayak, 2013).
On this line of reasoning, the generic competitor paradox could be construed as a
principal-agent problem in which physician loyalty to innovator brand drugs results in prescriber
decisions that differ from the wishes of either the patient or third-party insurance payers
(Kanavos, 2008; Lundin, 2000). In keeping with observational evidence, we assume that the
innovator incumbent is more expensive than the generic substitute. Consequently, a distortion
of the principal-agent relationship would result in the observed trend of price-inelastic demand
for innovator brand drugs and residual loyalty to the brand (habit persistence) even upon the
entry of cheaper bioequivalent generics (Lundin, 2000).
Conversely, it may be that the demand for innovator brand-name drugs is price elastic
but this price elasticity in demand is masked by insurance coverage (Lundin, 2000) . While the
physician is a perfect agent for the patient, neither the principal patient nor the physician agent
is incentivised to prefer the lower-priced generic products because of insulation from the extra
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cost by low insurance deductibles. If the physician places a higher weight on the patient’s utility
than on insurance expenditures, increased insurance coverage leads to a lower probability of
generic prescribing when the physician values the utility of the patient more than the insurance
expenditure (Crea et al., 2019). The physician is a perfect agent for the patient but an imperfect
agent for the insurer. If patients required to pay large sums out-of-pocket are less likely to have
innovator brand-name versions prescribed than patients getting most of their costs reimbursed,
this would be indicative of moral hazard as defined by Pauly 1968: the existence of insurance
leads patients to overconsume medical care because they do not bear the full marginal cost of
provision (Lundin, 2000; Nayak, 2013).
In accordance with Pauly (1968), the use of the term “moral hazard” refers to patients
who may demand (and receive) too much or too expensive care relative to the social optimum
because the existence of insurance coverage, as a consequence of which the patient does not
directly bear the full marginal cost of care (Pauly, 1968) . This characterisation of moral hazard in
insurance contrasts with the more commonly used definition, which implies that the existence
of health insurance encourages patients to engage in more risky behaviour (Hellerstein, 1994;
Hellerstein, 1998) . While the latter type of moral hazard certainly may exist, Pauly (1968)
emphasises that even with totally risk averse patients, the existence of insurance may lead to
overconsumption of healthcare because the marginal cost of treatment is not borne by the
patient (Arrow, 2004; Pauly, 1968). In the context of the multisource drug market, moral hazard
in insurance means that despite price advantages neither the insured patient nor physician has
the incentive to overcome switching costs from the well-established innovator drug to a newer
unknown generic. As a result, the patient does not demand the socially optimal amount of
13

prescription drugs and instead receives either too many drugs or overly expensive drugs relative
to what is socially optimal (Hellerstein, 1994). Despite the suboptimal use of prescription drugs,
the physician in their prescribing role is a perfect agent for the patient but an imperfect agent to
the financier of healthcare.
Insurance coverage is incorporated in our conceptual framework of prescriber brand
equity as a moderating variable. We hypothesise that cultivating the brand equity of innovator
drugs during the drug patent term explains residual brand loyalty or habit persistence in
subsequent multisource drug markets. We expect that the consequences of brand equity - brand
loyalty and habit persistence- are further bolstered by insurance coverage that cushions patients
from incurring the extra cost (price premium) associated with prescribing the innovator drug over
generic equivalents. Therefore, the removal of third- party payer insulation from costs,
encourages patient switching behaviour from the innovator to generic drug, which is reflected in
prescriber practice. Findings that support the preferential prescribing of innovator drugs to
patients based on insurance coverage would be evidence of moral hazard.
CAVEATS REGARDING NOMENCLATURE
A noteworthy disclaimer regarding diction in this dissertation: The term “generic” is used
rather loosely in many discussions of prescription pharmaceuticals. It can variously refer to
versions of a drug sold under the actual generic name, or to drugs not marketed by the original
innovator firm (Hellerstein, 1994; Hellerstein, 1998). Moreover, while most of these newer
bioequivalent entrants are designated generic status, some of these newcomers may be labelled
as “brand generic drugs” as they are marketed under a name other than the chemical name
14

(Berger, 2018). To clarify this ambiguity in terminology, first-to-market originator branded drugs
are henceforth labelled “innovator” with all successive bioequivalent competitors referred to as
the “generics”. Therefore, some “generics’” in our analysis include FDA reference listed drugs
which are bioequivalent but approved and marketed after the originator drug.
designation is also assigned to drugs recorded by physician under the chemical name.

15

Generic

JUSTIFICATION
PUBLIC HEALTH SIGNIFICANCE
Conceptualising brand equity from the perspective of the prescribing physician provides
a rationale as to why health care payers and consumers alike are failing to realise the cost savings
of a competitive off-patent drug market despite proven bioequivalence of generics, policies
favouring generic drugs, and pressure from payers towards generic substitution.
Notably, brand equity is but one aspect of the prescription decision. External influencers
such as drug availability, the patient’s preference and medical profile, payer preference,
pharmacy substitution, pharmaceutical marketing efforts and generic drug policy, all impact the
final prescription decision. However, the central argument put forward in this project is that,
ceteris paribus, brand equity as perceived by the prescribing physician establishes brand
preference, which in turn has a strong impact on prescription decisions. Indeed, the aforementioned external factors are but modifiers of prescription behaviours which come into play
only after notions of drug brand superiority (or lack thereof) are already deeply entrenched.

SIGNIFICANCE FOR PAYERS
An appreciation of how brand equity drivers and moral hazard impact the prescription
decision will enable third party payers to better align their policies and incentives to those of the
physician prescriber, thus lowering formulary costs where pharmacy substitution is over-ridden
on the prescription order.

16

SIGNIFICANCE FOR PHARMACEUTICAL FIRMS
Notwithstanding the cost of research and development (Ellison & Ellison, 2011), the
period of market exclusivity granted by a patent remains fixed. There is therefore a need for
innovators to recoup costs and maximise their return on investment far beyond patent
expiration. A crucial means of achieving this end is to sustain brand loyalty beyond patent
expiration and upon entry of new generic competitors. Cultivating the brand equity of a patented
drug creates a momentum in demand during the years of market exclusivity that continues upon
patent expiration and consequent entry of generic competitors (Blackett & Robins, 2001).
Realising brand value and extending brand equity beyond patent expiration requires a
systemic and strategic approach in marketing efforts targeting physicians. Understanding the
brand equity drivers of physician prescription behaviour is the first step in tailoring
pharmaceutical marketing and branding efforts to achieve greatest impact on the prescribing
behaviours of physicians.
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HYPOTHESES AND THEORETICAL RATIONALE
The overarching assertion of this dissertation is that brand equity is critically important
for physician prescribers to make points of differentiation between innovator branded drugs
and their generic alternatives. Accordingly, physician prescribers will - ceteris paribus –
preferentially prescribe drugs with highest brand equity, which for the reasons subsequently
cited tend to be innovator branded drugs.
Of note, there are 3 assertions drawn from Aaker’s and Keller’s customer-based brand
equity model that inform the ensuing hypotheses. Namely, that an innovator drug with high
brand equity will: (1) command a price premium over and above that of substitute generics; (2)
be perceived as qualitatively superior to empirically bioequivalent substitutes; and consequently,
(3) be prescribed more frequently than these generic alternatives having cultivated its own
intractable brand loyal prescriber base.
Subsequently, brand equity is characterised by both a price differential and an
informational differential between the innovator branded drug and generic alternatives.
Extrapolating from Aaker’s and Keller’s conceptualisation of brand equity (Aaker, 1991; Aaker,
1992; Aaker, 1996; Keller, 2001; Keller & Lehmann, 2006) , the assumed directionality of these
associations is such that innovator drugs with higher perceived quality than their bioequivalent
generic substitutes, engender a greater sense of brand loyalty from prescribers. This instilled
brand loyalty to the innovator drug serves to bolster market demand as signalled by a price
premium, the added value of which, constitutes brand equity.
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HYPOTHESIS 1
Longer periods of innovator market exclusivity bestow a first-mover (pioneer) competitive
advantage to the innovator drug in subsequent multisource markets
Our central premise is that innovator drugs have a first-mover competitive advantage
over subsequent generic market entrants. We contend that this first mover advantage is granted
in part by the monopoly protections of a drug patent and monopoly gains are paradoxically
evident once patent protections expire and new generics enter the market. We hypothesise that
innovator incumbents that previously held a longer tenure of market exclusivity (through patent
extensions or other afore-mentioned means of strategic entry deterrence) will have price and
brand loyalty advantages in post-patent multisource markets.
Accordingly, our analytic model measures the impact of monopoly in facilitating the
creation of innovator brand equity that persists long after the removal of barriers to entry and
the creation of a multisource drug market. Our theoretical rationale is that if brand equity is
indeed an experiential outcome, then innovator drugs with longer periods of market exclusivity
have a longer duration in which to cultivate this equity which is evidenced by physician loyalty to
the innovator drug that persists in the subsequent multisource drug market.
Moreover, because brand equity is by definition “added value” owing to the brand name,
we expect that patients will be willing to pay a price premium for an innovator drug with positive
brand equity despite the entry of viable (often cheaper) substitutes. This sustained loyalty to the
innovator drug can be a strategic barrier for newer generic players to overcome; they too must
cycle through the process of building their own “brand equity”. Extrapolating Aaker’s theorem,
we hypothesise that for physicians to switch to the newer generic or indeed minimise the
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perceived quality differential between the innovator and the new generic, the latter must at least
in part catch up with the brand equity head start that the innovator incumbent already possesses.
Succinctly stated, our model tests whether generic drugs pitted against innovator incumbents
with an extended period of market exclusivity face an uphill battle despite favourable pricing.
Perceptibly, if this hypothesis is confirmed by our model, extending innovator monopoly
protections (such as through patent term extensions) serves the purpose of strategic entry
deterrence even when monopoly barriers to entry are themselves removed.
Certainly, Aaker’s proposed brand equity model (Aaker, 1992; Aaker, 1996) includes a
domain for proprietary assets such as patents, which give a firm a temporary monopoly and thus
create circumstantial loyalty (Aaker, 1991). We hypothesise that this circumstantial loyalty to the
innovator (imposed by a lack of alternatives), morphs into deeply rooted brand loyalty that
persists beyond patent expiration (despite the competitive benefits of a multisource drug
market). Keller provides a theoretical rationale through his pyramidal brand resonance model
(Keller, 2001), which delineates a psychological process by which intransigent brand loyalty (aptly
labelled “brand resonance”) is achieved in a series of sequential steps. Perceptibly, the
implementation of this process requires an investment in time. In context, the longer an
innovator drug has a monopoly on the market, the lengthier its lead time to build up physicianbased brand equity. Protracted market exclusivity - granted by either patent protections or other
barriers to entry for generic substitutes - confers the vanguard innovator crucial time to cultivate
brand equity and form a loyal customer base. Conversely, later generic entrants must in addition
to marketing themselves to prescribers (to establish Aaker’s domains of knowledge and
awareness), also establish perceived quality and therapeutic equivalency to the innovator(Aaker,
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1991; Aaker, 1992; Aaker, 1996). Inevitably, these ensuing generics must either chip away at the
innovator drug’s loyalty base and/or create their own loyal customer base, which takes time.
In contrast, innovator drugs with longer periods of market exclusivity, have a head start
over generic entrants – extra time during which to cultivate brand equity, and form a loyal
customer base. Upon patent expiration, built-up brand equity is manifested as product
differentiation in the face of other highly substitutable alternatives (Aaker, 1996). Due to
perceived product differentiation, the temporary monopoly created by the patent converts not
to a perfectly competitive open market, but rather a situation of monopolistic competition in
which the innovator has the competitive advantage. This hypothesised first-mover lead would
be evident in both the innovator’s ability to sustain a price premium, and the prescriber’s
willingness to continue to preferentially prescribe the innovator despite the competitive
challenge imposed by cheaper bioequivalent generic substitutes
For these reasons, we expect that longer periods of innovator market exclusivity will be
associated with a greater likelihood of innovator prescriptions once the market is open to
competition from generics. Additionally, we predict that because of cultivated brand equity,
physicians will be more likely to prescribe innovator drugs regardless of sustained price premiums
in multisource drug markets
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HYPOTHESIS 2
Physicians will initially overestimate the perceived relative therapeutic benefit between an
innovator drug and a generic entrant. This consensus quality differential between an innovator
and its bioequivalent generic will diminish over time as physicians familiarise themselves with
the generic.
The estimation models related to our second hypothesis expound on prescriber learning
and switching behaviour by delineating the process of time-dependent information diffusion and
generic drug acceptance among physicians. We compare prescribing behaviour for newer
generics against that of older generics to determine how physicians’ attitudes towards generics
differ based on market tenure. Aaker and Keller’s brand equity theories lead us to hypothesise
that the information differential between innovator and generic will diminish over time. The key
assumption of this model is that the duration of generic market availability reflects the degree of
learning and knowledge about the generic, which in turn is a good proxy for the generic’s
consensus perceived quality. We assert that the information differential between newer versus
older versions of a drug reflects the consensus quality differential (Howard, 1997). If indeed
brand equity is at play in prescription decisions, we expect that physicians will be less likely to
prescribe newer generics versus the older innovator drug due to an overestimation of the quality
differential of the innovator drug relative to the newer generic. Over time, physicians familiarise
themselves with the generic substitute, the information differential lessens, and thus the
consensus quality differential diminishes to approach that of the true quality differential.
If indeed innovator drugs have a head start on subsequent generics, it stands to reason
that generics could eventually bridge this gap. Time confers generic substitutes the opportunity
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to build their own “equity”, as physicians familiarise themselves with the drug. Accordingly, the
likelihood of prescribing the innovator or generic version of a drug could be indicative of
information diffusion and learning - the gap in prescriber knowledge and familiarity between the
innovator and generic entrants. As per Aaker’s model – product awareness and perceived quality
are essential contributors to brand equity(Aaker, 1991). Physicians will more readily switch to
older generics but remain loyal to the innovator drug (i.e. habit persistence) in the case of newer
generics. This process of time-dependent information diffusion is borne by the literature
(Howard, 1997).
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HYPOTHESIS 3
Insurance status overrides brand equity preferences
A factor that is likely to override physician preferences for innovator drugs is insurance
coverage. Our third hypothesis tests the influence of external nudges exerted by third party
payers. The corresponding analytical objective examines the role of insurance coverage in
qualifying physician brand loyalty. Our estimated model tests whether habit persistence and
brand loyalty are altered by insurance coverage. Thus, it is essential to investigate whether
physicians are more sensitive to costs incurred by individual patients or certain insurance types,
and less responsive to costs borne by other third-party payers. If physicians in our study sample
systematically vary prescription decisions based on patient insurance coverage or lack thereof,
this is evidence of moral hazard - whilst a perfect agent to the patient, the physician is a less
perfect agent to the financier of healthcare. As innovator drugs tend to be more expensive than
ensuing generics, we hypothesise that patients in my reference category of uninsured or self-pay
patients will be least likely to receive branded innovator drugs, which is evidence of moral hazard
(Lundin, 2000; Nayak, 2013). Consistent with the literature, we also expect fewer innovator drug
prescriptions to be dispensed to patients enrolled in public health insurance schemes such as
Medicaid and Medicare (Rice, 2011), and cost containment payer systems such as Health
Maintenance Organisations (HMOs) (Nayak, 2013; Thier, 2011).
In accordance with the literature, we hypothesise that the innovator drug has a
competitive advantage granted in part by its first-mover market presence and monopoly patent
protections. Subsequently, physicians have greater familiarity and experience with the innovator
than the ensuing generics. Brand equity theory asserts that such familiarity with the innovator is
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over time translated to a perception of superior quality. Thus, when faced with a patient
encounter featuring third party financing, in which generic-innovator cost differences are
masked, we theorise that the only criterion under consideration is quality. We hypothesise that
the trade-off between cost and quality is eliminated. For the reasons given, a prescription
decision process hinging on quality alone favours the innovator. Hence insurance coverage in this
scenario alters the physician’s prescription decision by eliminating the cost-quality trade-off. This
alteration of prescription behaviour because of third-party financing typifies moral hazard. If our
hypothesis of moral hazard is valid, we expect that patients with insurance will be more likely to
be issued prescriptions for the innovator drug even if it is only marginally perceived to be of
higher quality. Conversely, we hypothesise that uninsured (self-pay) patients, will be more
acutely aware of innovator-generic price differentials and because of this price-sensitivity, will
receive the more inexpensive generic at higher rates.
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Figure 1: The Three Domains of Physician-Based Brand Equity
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SPECIFIC AIMS AND OBJECTIVES
Upon patent expiration, branded innovator drugs face competition from newer generic
entrants, which should theoretically drive prices down. In this dissertation, we posit that
innovator drugs with long periods of monopoly and sustained prices above those of competitors
have achieved brand equity - added value endowed by the brand to the product (Farjam &
Hongyi, 2015) .
The overarching goal of this dissertation is to ascertain whether brand equity influences
prescriber preferences between innovator (brand) drugs and generic alternatives and if third
party payers can override such preferences. This will be accomplished by the following aims:
AIM 1: To verify the presence of an innovator first-mover advantage and quantify its impact on
physician preferences in a multisource drug market
➔ Are innovator drugs preferentially prescribed over generic drugs in a multisource drug
market?
➔ Do the most frequently prescribed innovator drugs retain a significant price premium over
bioequivalent generics?
➔ Is there an association between the length of innovator monopoly and ensuing prescriber
preferences once generics are made available?

AIM 2: To delineate the process of generic drug acceptance (learning and switching behaviour)
among physician prescribers
➔ Does increased prescriber experience with new generics counteract the first-mover
advantage and brand equity of innovator drugs?
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➔ How do market conditions (timing of market entry, price differentials and number of
generic competitors) influence prescriber switching behaviour away from the innovator
brand?

AIM 3: To examine the role of insurance coverage in qualifying physician brand loyalty
➔ How do prescription brand preferences vary based on patient insurance coverage?
➔ Are physicians more responsive to costs incurred by patients than costs incurred by thirdparty payers?
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CONCEPTUALISING BRAND EQUITY
Brand equity in this dissertation is defined as the incremental monetary value accrued by the
innovator drug due to its brand status in comparison to bioequivalent generic substitutes. The
prescriber perspective portrayed in this dissertation is an adaptation of consumer-based brand
equity: The two most influential conceptualisations of consumer-based brand equity are those
of Aaker (1991) and Keller (1993).
Aaker (1991) defines brand equity as “a set of brand assets and liabilities linked to a brand,
its name and symbol, that add to or subtract from the value provided by a product or service to
a firm and/or to that firm’s customers” (p.15). Aaker (1991) provides a comprehensive brand
equity model comprised of five domains: brand loyalty; brand name awareness; perceived brand
quality; brand associations in addition to perceived quality; and other proprietary brand assets –
e.g., patents, trademarks, and channel relationships.
Keller (1993) develops the consumer-based brand equity model (CBBE), which is the most
widely used model today. Keller defines CBBE by stating that the power of a brand rests on what
the clients have “learned, felt, seen, and heard about it through time, that is, rests in their minds”.
Hence, CBBE is “the differential effect of brand knowledge on consumer response to the
marketing of the brand” (Keller, 1993). Keller’s (1993) definition of CBBE is used in arguing that
brand equity is positioned based on what consumers feel, see, and hear about the brand through
time, therefore, the meaning of brand equity rests in the consumers’ minds. Keller’s brand
resonance model (2011) adds to Aaker’s conceptualisation by introducing a stepwise sequential
series of steps, from bottom to top: (1) ensuring identification of brand with customers and an
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association of the brand in customers' minds with a specific class or customer need; (2) firmly
establishing the totality of brand meaning in the minds of customers by strategically linking a
host of tangible and intangible brand associations. (3) Eliciting the proper customer responses in
terms of brand- related judgment and feelings, and (4) converting brand response to create an
intense, active loyalty relationship between customers and the brand.
Our depiction of brand equity as a psychological construct draws upon Aaker’s and Keller’s
models: Keller’s stepwise brand resonance pyramid is adopted and applied to Aaker’s
interpretation of brand equity. The first step to building the brand equity of a drug is brand
awareness or salience. Brand salience relates to how often and easily the brand is evoked in the
mind of the prescriber – it includes brand-name recognition and recall. Steinman et al concluded
that a characteristic as elementary as the length of the drug name in comparison to competitors,
can influence prescriber decisions towards the drug with shorter appellation, as longer names
are less easy to recall (Steinman, Chren, & Landefeld, 2007). Conjointly, brand salience and brand
awareness establish brand identity in the mind of the physician prescriber (Aaker, 1991; Aaker,
2009; Keller, 1993; Keller & Lehmann, 2006).
The second step in building brand equity of an innovator drug is instilling positive brand
associations within the mind of the prescriber (Aaker, 1991); The equivalent of brand associations
in Keller’ s model is brand performance and brand imagery. Brand performance relates to how
the drug meets physician's functional objectives regarding treatment. Brand imagery deals with
the extrinsic properties of the drug, including abstract associations(Keller, 2001). Together brand
performance and brand imagery establish brand meaning within the mind of the prescriber.
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The penultimate step towards establishing brand equity is to influence the physician’s brand
response to the brand-name by influencing attitudinal aspects of perceived quality (Aaker, 1991)
. This response according to Keller’s brand resonance model includes formation of brand
judgements and brand feelings towards the drug brand in question. Brand judgments focus on
the physician's own personal opinions and evaluations. Brand feelings are the physicians'
(subconscious) emotional responses and reactions with respect to the brand.
The final step in the brand equity continuum is establishing brand loyalty (Aaker, 1991) or
brand resonance (Keller, 1993; Keller, 2001). Brand resonance refers to the nature of the
relationship that customers have with the brand and the extent to which customers feel that they
are "in sync" with the brand. Resonance is characterised in terms of the intensity or depth of the
psychological bond customers have with the brand, as well as the level of activity engendered by
this loyalty (Keller, 2001; Pradhan & Misra, 2014).
At this juncture, we reiterate our contextual definition of brand equity: the value premium
that an innovator drug with a recognisable name generates when compared to its bioequivalent
generic. Drawing from Aaker and Keller’s conceptualisation of brand equity, this added value is
determined by consumer perceptions and experiences with the brand. Due to the principalagent relationship within the healthcare context, we assert that the key decision-maker or
“consumer” subject to brand equity influence is the physician agent. Referencing our conceptual
model, brand equity is an experiential outcome: It develops and grows because of a physician’s
experiences with the innovator brand drug. The brand equity process typically involves a
progression of interaction with the innovator brand drug that unfolds following a predictable
model: Awareness → Recognition → Trial → Development of preferences and positive
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associations → Brand Loyalty. Brand equity is attained when an innovator drug is well recognised
and easily recalled by prescribers, subjectively perceived to be of superior quality to
bioequivalent generics, and hence preferentially prescribed in a multisource drug market.
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Figure 2: Brand Equity as a Psychological Construct
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Figure 3: Conceptual Summary of Objectives and Hypotheses

INNOVATOR

GENERIC

(HABIT
PERSISTENCE)

(SWITCHING
BEHAVIOUR)

FIRST-MOVER
ADVANTAGE OF
INNOVATOR DRUGS
(AIM 1)

GENERIC DRUG
ACCEPTANCE (AIM 2)

PROVIDER MORAL HAZARD (AIM 3)

34

METHODS
STUDY DESIGN
This dissertation relies on secondary data from the 2015 and 2016 National Ambulatory
Medical Care Survey (NAMCS), which is a cross-sectional national survey of non-federally
employed office-based physicians who are primarily engaged in direct patient care(National
Center for Health Statistics, 2019b).
The data set is uniquely suited to assessing physician demand for innovator (“brand”)
drugs because one can decipher which version of the drug – innovator or generic successor – was
initially prescribed by the physician hence surmise physician preferences. In contrast, drug
mentions on most other secondary data sources- such as insurance claims datasets-are of drugs
ultimately dispensed to the patient, which might instead reflect pharmacist substitution and/ or
drug formulary restrictions imposed by the payer. As our interest is primarily in physician
prescription behaviour, the focus is on the physician’s choice of medication, as initially entered,
regardless of the version of the drug eventually dispensed.
DESCRIPTION OF DATA SET
Sampling Strategy
The National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS) is a nationally representative
survey of non-federally employed office-based physicians who are primarily engaged in direct
patient care. The annual survey randomly selects a group of office-based physicians to record
information on approximately 30 patient visits for a randomly assigned 1-week reporting period.
The basic sampling unit for the NAMCS is the physician-patient encounter or visit. The survey is
purposed to address the need for empirical information about the provision and use of
ambulatory medical care services in the United States. Each year, physicians in ambulatory
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settings are recruited to complete data forms for a representative sample of patient visits.
Sampling is conducted using a multi-stage stratified probability approach and visit weights and
clustering variables are available to convert survey data to nationally representative estimates
(CDC/National Center for Health Statistics, 2019).
The NAMCS utilises a multistage probability design that involves probability samples of
primary sampling units (PSUs), physician practices within PSUs, and patient visits within practices.
The first-stage sample includes 112 PSUs (CDC/National Center for Health Statistics, 2019). PSUs
are geographic segments composed of counties, groups of counties, county equivalents. Using
these geographical groupings, a probability sample of practising physicians is selected from the
master files maintained by the American Medical Association and the American Osteopathic
Association. Within each sampling unit, all eligible physicians were stratified by specialty
(CDC/National Center for Health Statistics, 2019) . Physicians were then assigned to 52 random
subsamples of approximately equal size – corresponding to 1 of the 52 weeks of the survey year.
Finally, a systematic random sample of visits is selected by the physician during the reporting
week. The sampling rate varies for this final step from a 100 percent sample for very small
practices, to a 20 percent sample for very large practices as determined in a presurvey interview
(CDC/National Center for Health Statistics, 2019; National Center for Health Statistics, 2019)
Data Collection
Notably, prescription data collection directly from the physician, rather than from the
patient, pharmacy or payer; dovetails well with the overall analytical objective - to evaluate the
physician prescription decision, separate from the constraints of generic substitution policy,
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payer mandates, and drug formulary restrictions, all of which may alter which version of the drug
the patient receives ((Steinman et al., 2007)
The U.S Census Bureau acts as the data collection agent. Each physician is randomly
assigned to a 1-week reporting period. During this week, physicians or medical office personnel
are instructed to keep a daily record of all patient visits. Often, the maintenance of this log falls
instead to Census field representatives. For example, more than half of the NAMCS Patient
Record forms submitted in 2009 (51.5 percent) were abstracted by Census Bureau staff rather
than by the physician or medical office personnel (CDC/National Center for Health Statistics,
2019). During this 1-week reporting period, data for a systematic random sample of visits are
recorded using an automated Patient Record form developed for this purpose. Visits were
selected from the list using a random start and a predetermined sampling interval based on the
physician’s estimated visits for the week and the number of days the physician was expected to
see patients that week. In this way, a systematic random sample of visits was obtained. The
sampling procedures were designed so that about 30 Patient Record forms were completed
during the assigned reporting week. This minimised the data collection workload and maintained
about equal reporting levels among sample physicians regardless of practice size (CDC/National
Center for Health Statistics, 2019; National Center for Health Statistics, 2019a).
Data are obtained on patient characteristics such as age, sex, race, and ethnicity, and visit
characteristics such as patient’s reason for visit, physician’s diagnosis, services ordered or
provided, and treatments, including medication therapy(CDC/National Center for Health
Statistics, 2019; National Center for Health Statistics, 2019). In addition, data about the physician
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and his or her practice characteristics are collected as part of a survey induction interview. The
data set also includes expected sources of payment for a visit including private insurance, public
insurance and self-pay options, which allows us to assess for the influence of a third-party payer
on the prescription decision and the existence of possible moral hazard among prescribers
(CDC/National Center for Health Statistics, 2019; Hellerstein, 1998; Howard, 1997) .
Scope and Limitations
The basic sampling unit for the NAMCS is the physician-patient encounter or visit. Only visits
to the offices of non-federally employed physicians classified by the American Medical
Association or the American Osteopathic Association as "office-based, patient care" are included
in the physician universe. Physicians in the specialties of anaesthesiology, pathology, and
radiology are excluded. Types of contacts not included are those made by telephone, those made
outside the physician’s office (for example, house calls), visits made in hospital settings (unless
the physician has a private office in a hospital and that office meets the NAMCS definition of
"office"), visits made in institutional settings by patients for whom the institution has primary
responsibility over time (e.g., nursing homes), and visits to doctors’ offices that are made for
administrative purposes only (e.g., to leave a specimen, pay a bill, or pick up insurance forms)
(CDC/National Center for Health Statistics, 2019; National Center for Health Statistics, 2019;
Nayak, 2013).
Of note, the NAMCS has practice characteristics, physician characteristics, patient
characteristics, but does not have information about interactions with pharmaceutical sales
representatives or other forms of industry influence which might influence the prescription
decision through increased brand awareness (Nayak, 2013).
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It is also important to reiterate that medications ordered are not necessarily the medications
ultimately dispensed to the patient by the pharmacist.

Barring physician injunction, the

pharmacist has leeway to substitute an innovator for a generic or vice versa. Hence one cannot
ascertain based on NAMCS disclosures which drug was ultimately dispensed to the patient
(Hellerstein, 1998). Nevertheless, as our research question focuses on the physician order rather
than the execution of it, any such discrepancies do not impact our conclusions.
DRUG SELECTION
This dissertation examines physician prescribing habits for the top multisource drugs
reported in the NAMCS database. We narrow our focus to the top 6 most prescribed multisource
drugs. Drugs in the database are assigned characteristics during data processing, based on the
Lexicon Plus®, a proprietary database of all prescription drugs products available in the United
States drug market (CDC/National Center for Health Statistics, 2019). Of note, NAMCS drug
variables are coded twice: first "as entered" by the physician on the survey data collection form,
using an NCHS-assigned 5-digit code, and second using a corresponding 6-digit genericequivalent code based on the Multum classification (National Center for Health Statistics, 2019)
. The Multum code for a given drug reflects up to 6 of its components. Therapeutic class (drug
category) is also assigned using Multum; up to 4 therapeutic classes can be assigned per drug in
NAMCS. Additionally, the NAMCS data set lists up to thirty drugs prescribed by the physician for
each patient encounter. To increase study power, all drug mentions are included in this analysis
and matched with the appropriate coded chemical entity. However, to avoid biasing the analysis
to physician specialties that prescribe/record many drugs, we calculate drug frequency (to
determine top multisource drugs) based only on the first drug mention(Steinman et al., 2007).
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To achieve our stated objectives and avoid confounding, it is necessary to supplement the
data set with drug-specific characteristics garnered from the publicly available FDA Electronic
Orange book (https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/ ). This resource details drug
idiosyncrasies such as narrow therapeutic indices, approved generic competitors, and drug
approval dates (if after January 1, 1982). The Orange Book also discloses therapeutic equivalency
concerns about generic successors, which is an important consideration impacting the likelihood
of substitution.
OTHER INCLUSION/EXLUSION CRITERIA
We will impose inclusion and exclusion criteria to the NAMCS data set to meet the stated
objectives regarding the physician prescription decision. At the outset, all records in which the
patient was seen by a non-physician provider or physician extender such as a nurse practitioner
or physician assistant, are dropped.
To reiterate, the analysis is limited to “multi-source” drugs (primary inclusion criterion).
By implication all “single source” drugs, that is, innovators without a generic equivalent on the
market (or vice versa) will be dropped from the analysis. Among the remaining multisource
drugs, supplementary information regarding drug-specific characteristics and pricing information
from the FDA Electronic Orange Book and Micromedex IBM Red Book respectively, is sought out
for the identified multisource drugs.
Moreover, as there is a tendency to code biologics and supplements by the generic name
of the product (e.g. “Hepatitis Vaccine,” “Vitamin B", “Iron Supplements"), without consideration
of the original trade names of the product prescribed, all prescriptions for these types of products
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are excluded from the analysis (Nayak, 2013). Also excluded from the analysis are drugs for which
a match could not be found with Multum Lexicon (a, c, or n codes).
Physician visits for which a drug was not prescribed are also excluded from the sample as
a prescription decision was not involved. Similarly, physician visits for which there is insufficient
payment information are dropped from the analysis, as these records may skew our assessment
of moral hazard.
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MEASUREMENT AND INSTRUMENTATION
Table 1: Measurement Matrix
MEASURED
DATA SOURCE
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLE TRANSLATION PROCEDURES /
RATIONALE
VARIABALE
CONSTRUCTON OF VARIABLE
AIM1: To verify the presence of an innovator first-mover advantage and quantify its impact on physician preferences in a multisource drug market
OUTCOME MEASURE (Y)
Likelihood of
NAMCS data set Binary outcome measure of Binary outcome measure
This variable directly measures prescriber
prescribing an
the decision to prescribe an 1= Innovator Prescribed
choice and thus is a proxy measure for
innovator drug
innovator drug or its generic 0= Generic prescribed
prescriber preference and brand loyalty.
alternative
In this model, preferential prescriptions for
the innovator drug imply a first-mover
advantage.
PRIMARY PREDICTORS OF FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE
Innovator
FDA “Orange
The period during which the Time elapsed (in years) between
We hypothesise that initial market
Monopoly Period book”
innovator drug has no
FDA approval of innovator drug to exclusivity is the main contributor to the
https://www.ac competitors i.e. has a
FDA patent approval of first
first-mover advantage of innovator drugs.
cessdata.fda.go monopoly on the market.
generic competitor.
This variable confirms our hypotheses as to
v/scripts/cder/o
whether the length of innovator monopoly
b/
Measures the impact of
confers it a pioneering advantage by way of
innovator market exclusivity
pricing or physician preference.
(including patent
protections) on prescriber
preferences in the
subsequent multi-source
drug market.

42

MEASURED
VARIABALE
Innovator Price
Premium

DATA SOURCE

DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLE

IBM
Micromedex
Red Book

Price differential between
the innovator drug and the
generic substitute.
Proxy measure for brand
equity (value premium of
innovator drug generated by
physician and patient
perception of superiority).

TRANSLATION PROCEDURES /
CONSTRUCTON OF VARIABLE
Unit = Average Wholesale Price
(AWP)
Natural log of the ratio of the
AWP of the innovator to the
median AWP of generic
substitutes.
The ratio of prices is used in lieu
of the arithmetic difference in
price between both versions of a
drug because innovator/ generic
price differences vary
considerably based on dosage and
product-form but the ratio of
generic price to innovator price is
largely unaffected by these
superficial characteristics. The
ratio of prices is transformed into
a natural logarithm so that
equivalent percentage differences
in the ratio will have equivalent
impacts.

RATIONALE
The price premium is a tacit measure of the
strength of a brand and thus a proxy for
brand equity, which results in a first mover
advantage(Aaker, 1996) . We assume that
an innovator brand with high brand equity
will be priced higher than empirically
substitutable generics.
By expressing the price difference as a ratio,
we assume that physicians are aware of the
relative price differences between brand
drugs and generic drugs (if not necessarily
the particulars), that is, physicians are price
sensitive
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MEASURED
DATA SOURCE
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLE TRANSLATION PROCEDURES /
VARIABALE
CONSTRUCTON OF VARIABLE
AIM 2: To delineate the process of generic drug acceptance among physicians
OUTCOME MEASURE (Y)
Likelihood of
NAMCS data set Binary outcome measure of Binary outcome measure
prescribing an
the decision to prescribe an 1= Innovator prescribed
innovator drug
innovator drug or its generic 0= Generic prescribed
(Model 2)
alternative

RATIONALE

This variable directly measures prescriber
choice and thus is a proxy measure for
prescriber preference and brand loyalty.
In the context of generic drug acceptance,
the likelihood of prescribing the innovator
drug is hypothesised to diminish as
information and awareness about successive
generic substitutes diffuses through the
marketplace of physician agents. Prescriber
choice in this model, reflects the degree of
awareness and acceptance of generic
alternatives in a multisource drug market.
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MEASURED
VARIABALE

DATA SOURCE

DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLE

TRANSLATION PROCEDURES /
CONSTRUCTON OF VARIABLE

RATIONALE

PRIMARY PREDICTORS OF TIME-DEPENDENT INFORMATION DIFFUSION (X)

Information
Differential

FDA “Orange
book”

Consensus information
differential between an
innovator drug and generic
substitute. This is also a
measure of the consensus
quality differential between
innovator and generic.
The ratio of the duration of
generic market availability
relative to duration of
innovator market
availability is the proxy for
the information differential.
Represents the degree of
information diffusion of a
generic relative to the
innovator incumbent.

The information differential measures degree
of awareness and learning about a generic.
The information differential also represents
the perceived quality estimation of the
Units: Time elapsed (in years)
between FDA approval of brand or generic relative to the innovator. As
physicians know more about a generic their
generic drug to January 1, 2015.
estimation of the generic’s quality increases
to approach that of the brand.
Generics approved prior to 1982
(i.e. prior to FDA data collection
In keeping with our hypotheses and preceding
period in orange book) are
literature (Howard, 1997), we expect that
assigned a ratio of 1.
physicians will initially overestimate the
quality differential between the innovator and
The generic availability ratio is
the new generic substitute. As physicians have
measured in logarithmic terms to
no experience with the generic, its true quality
render equal percentage
is unknown – there is a large information
differences in the ratio equivalent
differential between the innovator and a new
for purposes of the estimation.
generic. As time passes, physicians become
familiar with therapeutic attributes of the
generic substitute. The information
differential between generic and innovator
diminishes. Concurrently, physicians revise
their estimation of the generic’s quality to
approach that of the true quality differential
(Howard, 1997).
Log of Years of generic drug availability
Years of Innovator drug availability
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MEASURED
VARIABALE
Innovator Price
Premium

DATA SOURCE

DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLE

The Red Book
(Truven Health
Analytics)

Price differential between
the innovator drug and the
generic substitute

TRANSLATION PROCEDURES /
CONSTRUCTON OF VARIABLE
Unit = Average Wholesale Price
(AWP)
Natural log of the ratio of the
AWP of the innovator to the
median AWP of generic
substitutes.

RATIONALE
The price premium is a tacit measure of the
strength of a brand and thus is a proxy for
brand equity(Aaker, 1996).
In context, the price premium quantifies the
impact of generic drug acceptance, such
that innovator predecessors of well-known
and widely accepted generic drugs, are
hypothesised to have a lower or nonsignificant price premium as the perceived
information differential between both
versions of the drug diminish. By reviewing
the correlation between the price premium
and the information differential we can
ascertain whether the gap between the
price of a generic drug and its innovator
counterpart grows smaller as the perceived
relative therapeutic benefit associated with
the brand-name decreases.
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MEASURED
VARIABALE

DATA SOURCE

DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLE

TRANSLATION PROCEDURES /
CONSTRUCTON OF VARIABLE

RATIONALE

AIM 3: To examine the role of moral hazard in qualifying physician brand loyalty
OUTCOME MEASURES (Y)

Likelihood of
prescribing an
innovator drug
(Model 3)

NAMCS data set

Binary outcome measure of
the decision to prescribe an
innovator drug or its generic
alternative

Binary outcome measure
1= Innovator Preference
0= Generic preference

PRIMARY PREDICTORS OF MORAL HAZARD AND HABIT PERSISTENCE (X)
Insurance Type
NAMCS data set Type of Insurance coverage
5 dummy categories: HMO/other
prepaid
plan, Medicaid, Medicare, private
/commercial insurance, and selfpay
Reference category is self-pay

Measure of brand loyalty and prescriber
preference.

If physicians exhibit moral hazard, we expect
that prescriptions of the innovator drug will
vary across insurance categories (Lundin,
2000; Nayak, 2013). If one or more of the
dummy insurance coefficients is significant it
may be construed as evidence of moral hazard
- physicians have a different likelihood of
prescribing generics to the reference category
of self-pay/uninsured patients than to patients
holding certain types of insurance.
However, if all categories of health insurance
exhibit no differential prescribing (no
significant coefficients) this supports the
notion of habit persistence i.e. physicians
prescribe the same drug to all patients
regardless of insurance status.
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MEASURED
VARIABALE
Innovator Price
Premium

Innovator price
premium
*Insurance
interactive term

DATA SOURCE

DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLE

IBM
Micromedex
Red Book

Ratio of average innovator
drug price to average
generic drug price in 2015

IBM
Micromedex
Red Book)
NAMCS data set

Interactive variable of Price
and Insurance
Describes how the price
difference between the
innovator and its generic
substitutes influences the
physician prescription
decision for patients with
different insurance coverage

TRANSLATION PROCEDURES /
CONSTRUCTON OF VARIABLE
Unit = Average Wholesale Price
Natural log of the ratio of the
innovator price to the median
generic price

Interaction variable

RATIONALE
The price differential is included as an
independent variable to pre-empt omitted
variable bias: The difference in price
between an innovator drug and its generic
successor is correlated with both the
patient’s or third party’s willingness to pay
for the drug and the physician’s willingness
to prescribe the drug.
Significant coefficients would suggest that
physicians are in part conscious of the price
differential between an innovator drug and
its generic substitutes.
Impact of innovator price premium on
prescriber preference for patients with
different insurance coverage. If any of these
variables is significant, the implication is that
physicians consider the innovator price
premium when prescribing the innovator
drug to patients with different insurance
coverage – an indication of moral hazard.
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MEASURED
VARIABALE

DATA SOURCE

DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLE

TRANSLATION PROCEDURES /
CONSTRUCTON OF VARIABLE

RATIONALE

Innovator
Monopoly Period

FDA “Orange
book”
https://www.acc
essdata.fda.gov/s
cripts/cder/ob/

The period during which the
innovator drug has no
competitors i.e. has a
monopoly on the market.

Time elapsed (in years) between FDA
approval of innovator drug to FDA
patent approval of first generic
competitor.

We hypothesise that initial market exclusivity is
the main contributor to the first-mover
advantage of innovator drugs. This variable
confirms our hypotheses as to whether the
length of innovator monopoly confers it a
pioneering advantage by way of pricing or
physician preference.

Time elapsed (in years) between FDA
approval of first generic drug to
January 1, 2015

Explicitly this variable measures the effect of
generic competition on the innovator’s brand
equity and physician prescription preferences.
Included in this first model to avoid overstating
the impact of innovator monopoly on prescriber
preferences thus avoiding omitted variable bias).
Implicitly, this variable also indicates whether
older generics ever catch up to their innovator
counterparts’
pioneering
advantage
as
determined by both a smaller price differential
and prescribing practices in favour of the generic.

Measures the impact of
innovator market exclusivity
(including patent protections)
on prescriber preferences in
the subsequent multi-source
drug market.

Years of Generic
Availability

FDA
book”

“Orange The duration generics have
been available
Duration of multisource market
competition
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MEASURED
VARIABALE

DATA SOURCE

DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLE

TRANSLATION PROCEDURES /
CONSTRUCTON OF VARIABLE

RATIONALE

Includes physician
characteristics available in
data set – specialty, and
demographics

Vector of dummy variables

This vector controls for heterogenous physician
characteristics.

Includes:
Region; Practice type;
Practice Ownership; Patient
record system; Electronic
prescriptions; Drug
formulary checks

Vector of dummy variables

COVARIATES FOR AIMS 1-3

Physician
Characteristics –

Practice
characteristics
- Region,
Practice
type

NAMCS data set

NAMCS data set

We expect that specialty physicians will be more
likely to have similar prescription habits with
high concordance within the group as to which
drug classes are prescribed in the generic form
and which drug classes are prescribed as brandname only. The drug case-mix will therefore
determine likelihood of generic substitution.
This vector controls for heterogenous practice
characteristics. Moreover, If the physician is a perfect
agent for the patient, then physician characteristics
should have no impact on the prescription decision.
Health economists have proposed that physician
practice follows a “Bayesian learning process”,
whereby physicians update their behaviour by
observing the behaviour of peers and adapts to the
“local style of practice” (Frank & Zeckhauser, 2007;
Phelps & Mooney, 1993). We expect to observe
similar prescribing habits among physicians in similar
practice types and regions. We also expect changes in
prescribing practices based on physician ownership –
Rice (2011) found that prescribing habits differ for
those in HMO owned practices. Moreover, the
implementation of electronic health records and
prescribing platforms is likely to modify behavioural
switching costs and, in the case of drug formularies,
encourage generic substitution
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MEASURED
VARIABALE
Patient
characteristics

DATA SOURCE

Drug Specific
Idiosyncrasies

NAMCS data set

NAMCS data set

DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLE

TRANSLATION PROCEDURES /
CONSTRUCTON OF VARIABLE
A
vector
of
patient Vector of dummy variables
characteristics including their
age and race
Controls for whether drug is Vector of dummy variables
combination therapy;
controlled substance;
narrow therapeutic index;
continued or new
medication

RATIONALE
This covariate measure controls for
heterogenous patient characteristics
Whether an innovator drug is considered as
part of a narrow therapeutic index will
increase perceived risk such that physicians
are less willing to substitute with a generic
(Nayak, 2013)
Because of behavioural switching costs and
inertia, I anticipate that those continuing an
already existent prescription of a branded
drug will continue receiving the branded drug
(Nayak, 2013).

Drug Controls

NAMCS data set

5 individual drug dummy
variables to flag
prescriptions for the most
frequently prescribed
multisource drugs within the
database

Vector of dummy variables

Included dummies for the top individual
multisource drugs and top therapeutic drug
classes to control for the influence of
unobservable drug characteristics other
than those already specified, for example
case-mix effects.
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ASSESSMENT OF MEASURES – RELIABILITY, VALIDITY AND GENERALISABILITY
Price Differentials
By explicitly incorporating price differentials as covariates in our analysis we can
determine whether physicians weigh drug costs against perceived therapeutic benefit when
prescribing a multisource drug. If indeed brand equity theory plays a significant role in
multisource drug markets, we expect that the price premium of the brand will reflect the
perceived superiority of the brand. We therefore predict that the gap between the price of a
generic drug and its innovator counterpart reflects the differences in perceived relative
therapeutic benefit.
Furthermore, the inclusion of price differentials in the third model facilitates an
assessment of moral hazard including the possibility of subtler interactive effects between an
innovator’s price premium and insurance type. For example, it is conceivable that physicians are
indeed creatures of habit prescribing innovator or generic versions of a drug to all patients
(Hellerstein, 1998) except in cases where the price premium of the innovator alternative exceeds
a certain expense threshold at which point, patients who face high out-of-pocket costs (such as
those classified self-pay or uninsured) are less likely to receive a significantly more expensive
innovator drug if cheaper generic substitutes are available.
Admittedly, drug prices are both opaque and constantly mutable, which impacts both the
reliability and validity of pricing data. As previously stated, we utilise average wholesale prices
(AWPs) culled from the Red Book to determine price differentials. According to the Red Book,
published by IBM Micromedex, the pricing information is "based on data obtained from
manufacturers, distributors, and other suppliers." However, despite the data source, published
AWPs have widely been recognised to be grossly inflated relative to actual market prices for
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prescription drugs. Nonetheless, we believe our findings about drug pricing to be valid, reliable,
and generalisable because our interest lies in the relative difference in drug pricing. Presumably,
physicians are themselves not privy to precise drug pricing information, and instead are more
likely to be cognisant of the relative price differences between innovator and generic drugs and
if price-sensitive will vary their prescribing behaviour based on this relative assessment of
expense, which is captured with enough accuracy by the price premium variable.
The Information Differential
The Information differential variable introduces the concept of information diffusion into
the second estimation equation. The intention of this variable is to capture how accurately a
physician can gauge the quality difference between innovator and generic substitute. Our
conceptualisation of this variable (The ratio of the duration of generic market availability relative
to duration of innovator market availability) accounts for the notion that a physician’s awareness
and knowledge about a given drug increases over time. Accordingly, the physician’s assessment
of quality differences between an innovator and its generic substitutes increases in accuracy the
longer the generic has been on the market. These arguments regarding consensus awareness,
knowledge, and perceived quality over time, echo both Aaker’s and Keller’s models of brand
equity. Yet despite theoretical grounding, the true market consensus quality differential remains
a latent variable, and thus inherently introduces some degree of measurement error into the
estimation.
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DATA MANAGEMENT
HUMAN SUBJECTS CONSIDERATION
This project relies primarily on publicly available secondary data from the National Centre
of Health Statistics, which has been anonymised to circumvent potential ethical concerns
including physician privacy protection and patient confidentiality. Though unlikely, any incidental
patient information disclosures are discarded in keeping with The Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPPA) guidelines. Supplementary drug pricing information sourced from
the Redbook (IBM Micromedex) is considered proprietary. Accordingly, the relevant precautions
have been taken in keeping with the organisation’s terms and conditions and the protocol
specified by the Office of Institutional Compliance at UTHealth. The use of a password is required
to access any proprietary data, which is stored and maintained in a manner consistent with
UTHealth research guidelines. Only academic advisors directly related to the project, supervisory
project/dissertation committee, and the study investigator have access to this portion of data.
All study protocols will undergo scientific review by the relevant University of Texas
project/dissertation review committees, and approval by the UTHealth Institutional Review
Board.
DATA INTEGRITY – MISSING DATA
NAMCS has a defined protocol for handling missing data. As per the microdata file for the
2015 survey, some survey items such as vital signs (e.g. height and weight) are presented with
calculated non-response rates. Other missing data items are imputed by randomly assigning a
value from a patient record form with similar characteristics, where similar visits are generally
those of the same specialty, geographic region or diagnostic group. Other data items such as
race, ethnicity, and time-spent with physician are imputed using a model-based, single,
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sequential regression imputation method (NAMCS microdata file, 2015 and 2016). Following a
convention implemented in 2007, missing data in the 2015 and 2016 dataset have consistent
negative codes indicating blank, unknown or inapplicable data. These coding conventions are
accounted for in the initial data cleaning in preparation for data analysis.
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DATA ANALYSIS
KEY A PRIORI ASSUMPTIONS IN THE MODEL DESIGN
In our analysis, we assume that the physician is a perfect agent for the patient. However, the
role of physician agency with respect to third-party financiers of healthcare is less clear, and thus
a subject for examination in our analysis.
In choosing between an innovator and its generic successor, the patient’s preferences for
either version of the drug is based solely on a trade-off between quality and cost. Notably, the
assessment of quality is subjective and person-specific hence the designation of “perceived
quality. It should also be explicitly stated that the entire rationale behind the analytical model is
built on the well-established premise that, in general, innovator drugs tend to be more expensive
than their generic successors. As such, the physician (as a perfect agent of the patient) will choose
the costlier innovator drug over less expensive generics only if the innovator drug is perceived to
have a higher quality value.
Our analysis tests if this quality and cost trade-off can be over-ridden by the presence of a
third-party payer, that is if insurance status alters the decision outcome. Particularly, we test the
hypothesis that insurance coverage (which presumably reduces out-of-pocket payments by the
patient) masks the true cost differences between the costlier innovator and the less expensive
generic successor thus altering the prescription decision (moral hazard). Notably this
investigation of moral hazard assumes that the physician is cognisant of the patient’s payer status
and price sensitivity, and as a perfect agent reflects these preferences in their prescription
decision. The analytical model also assumes that the physician is aware of the relative magnitude
and direction of the innovator-generic price differential (large, small, inversely related), even if
56

unclear about exact price points. A qualitative judgement that an innovator drug is more, less, or
comparably expensive than its generic equivalent, should suffice. If indeed insurance coverage
masks the true innovator-generic cost differential, then the only criterion under consideration is
quality. As neither patient nor physician perceive a cost difference between an innovator and its
generic, the physician will prescribe the version of a drug considered to be of higher quality.
While physicians may be somewhat cognisant of the relative cost differences between an
innovator and its generic equivalents, a priori, the physician agent is somewhat less certain about
the quality of the generic relative to its innovator predecessor. This assumption underscores our
second hypothesis that physicians will initially overestimate the perceived relative therapeutic
benefit between an innovator drug and a generic entrant. This information differential between
an innovator and its bioequivalent generic will diminish over time as physicians familiarise
themselves with the generic.
The rationale here is that there is a cost to ascertain the quality of a generic - time invested
in experience and research, that is, a switching cost associated with prescribing a generic. While
the price of the drug is borne by the insurer and patient, the switching cost is incurred by the
physician prescriber. Therefore, this switching cost must be tagged onto the retail price to assess
the total cost incurred by both patient and physician i.e. Total Cost of Generic = Price of Generic
+ Switching Cost. A rational decision-maker would choose to have the generic form of a drug
prescribed only if his or her assessment of quality far supersedes the total cost of the generic,
which is comprised of the accounting cost of the drug and the switching cost (Nayak, 2013).
Given that generics are only available once patent protections for the innovator drug have
expired, this switching cost is the effort required of the physician to update their information
about the new generics relative to the incumbent innovators and as such is a time dependent
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(Nayak, 2013). Indeed, at the point of generic market entry, physicians are already familiar with
the innovator drug’s quality profile. Thus, the decision to instead prescribe a generic would
involve effort, psychological and time-based switching costs whereby the physician evaluates the
quality of the newer generic against the quality profile of the time-tested innovator drug.
Empirically, this means that generic substitution practices (and associated switching costs)
should change as physician awareness and knowledge regarding the generic’s quality profile
increases. Consequently, switching costs contingent on a trade-off between novelty versus
certainty should diminish over time until they are almost negligible. Succinctly stated, the total
cost of the generic (i.e. Price of Generic + Switching Cost) diminishes but perception of quality
increases as more is known about the generic, that is, as the generic builds its own brand equity.
The cost-quality trade-off is altered during the lifecycle of the generic, becoming more favourable
over time.
The following is succinct equational portrayal of the preceding discussion.
•

A rational and perfect physician agent would choose the innovator drug where
QB - QG > CB - CG + Cs

•

Where QB is the quality of the innovator drug; QG is the quality of the generic; CB is the cost
of the innovator drug; CG is the cost of the generic; CS is the switching cost

•

Conversely, under perfect agency a rational physician would opt for the generic successor
drug where: QG – QB > CB - CG + Cs or QB - QG < CB - CG + Cs
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MODEL ESTIMATION
A physician’s prescription decision process is influenced by a complex range of personspecific, socioeconomic and pharmacological considerations unique to the agency relationship
and healthcare. Appreciably, modelling these determinants would involve capturing latent,
interactive, and complex measures by substituting observable characteristics to glean insight into
the drivers of brand preferences.
The dynamics of the multisource drug markets including the impact of market exclusivity,
perceived quality and moral hazard on physician prescription decisions have been investigated
repeatedly. Concurrently, far-removed within the subject area of marketing there have been
vigorous psychometric analyses of both Aaker’s and Keller’s domains of brand equity. What
hitherto has yet to be achieved is the combination of these two distinct spheres of expertise. To
this end, our analytical approach measures the competitive advantage an innovator incumbent
has over subsequent bioequivalent generics owing to brand equity. Our estimation models
explore the merits of brand equity for the innovator drug as it pertains to market monopoly
protections and strategic entry deterrence (aim 1); switching behaviour versus habit
persistence (aim 2); and favourable payment structures (aim 3).
Our regression analysis builds upon the work of 5 authors namely, Hellerstein (1994 &
1998), Howard (1997), Steinman (2007), Rice (2011), and Nayak (2013). Using NAMCS as a sample
frame and similar estimation methods, each of these authors has found evidence consistent with
brand equity in multisource prescription decisions including: “habit persistence, “switching
costs”, “brand preferences” and “economic branding”. Yet to date, none of the vanguards within
this niche of the literature have incorporated brand equity theory to explicate results or to inform
their analytical approach. Our contribution to the literature is formalise what have previously
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been consistent though unexplained findings about a provider’s pharmaceutical brand
preferences, by utilising brand equity theory.
To reiterate, the basic sampling unit for NAMCS is the physician-patient encounter or
office visit. It is likely that prescriptions written by the same physician are correlated. This line of
reasoning is further bolstered by repeated evidence of habit persistence among individual
physicians. For example, Howard (1997) found that specific antimicrobial drugs e.g.
sulfamethoxazole-trimethoprim, are always prescribed by physicians as either Bactrim or Septra
(brand-name forms), while amoxicillin is mostly prescribed as the generic. Therefore, in keeping
with the precedent set forth by Hellerstein (1994), we estimate our model using a logit
specification with clustering of prescriptions written by the same physician. By controlling for the
physician cluster effect, each physician cluster forms the unit of observation in lieu of using each
patient encounter as the unit of observation (Rice, 2011). Notably, Rice (2011) found that
standard errors based on the physician clusters minimise the effect of multiple observations per
physician. In comparison to non-clustered robust standard errors, the clustered standard errors
tended to be larger, reducing the statistical significance of most covariates (Rice, 2011).
To test our hypotheses, we propose a series of logistic regression models that align with
study objectives. Each of the logistic regression models separately tests a different group of
independent variables in relation to our outcome variable. These independent variable sets
pertain to pioneer/ first-mover advantage characteristics, information diffusion characteristics,
and Insurance coverage characteristics. Our primary outcome measure is a binary variable which
describes the likelihood of a physician prescribing an innovator (brand-name) drug. This binary
prescription decision variable is assigned as: 1- Physician prescribes the innovator version of a
drug or 0 – Physician prescribes the generic version of a drug. Notably, having a first-mover
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advantage and information diffusion are inherent to the process of creating brand equity (Aaker,
1992). Moral hazard is introduced to the equation as a mitigating factor through the insurance
coverage variable. The same set of covariates are included in each model and are purposed to
control for practice, physician, patient and drug characteristics. Though we will separately model
the relationship between our regressors and our outcome prescription decision variable, the
basic model for this analysis can be expressed as:
E(Y|x) = F(β0 + β1X1 + … + βkXk)
Where:
Y = likelihood of Prescribing an Innovator drug (1) or a Generic Drug;
X1 - Xk = observed independent variables;
β0 - βk = estimated model coefficients; and
F(.) = the logistic function.
Estimation Equation
The estimation equation surmises the decision on whether to prescribe the innovator version of a drug,
for the dth drug, ith patient and jth physician.
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟

Log ( 1−𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟) = β0 + βz Z + βD Dd + βPPj + βx Xi + βI Ii + εijd
Where:
Z = A vector of brand equity characteristics including length of monopoly, length of generic drug
availability, information differential, and price premium
Dd= A vector of drug dummies and prescription characteristics
P= A vector of physician and practice characteristics
X= A vector of patient characteristics
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Ii = A vector of patient’s insurance coverage or expected payment source
Of note, I do not consider medical condition as part of the patient’s relevant personal
characteristics. Indeed, while the patient’s condition affects the type of drug prescribed, it is unlikely to
dominate the decision to prescribe innovator version of a drug versus the generic.

Referencing

Hellerstein, 1998, the condition of the patient can be construed to be an unobserved characteristic of the
patient that remains in the residual.
Based on the results of the logistic regression models aligned with each of the 3 aims, a composite
prescription decision model will be constructed. This final model blends all 3 groups of independent
variables – brand equity, information diffusion, and moral hazard variables – adjusting the regression
based on fit, collinearity, specification, significance of predictors, and parsimony. Parameter level tests of
significance will use the z-statistic based on each parameter’s robust standard error. Overall model
significance will be assessed using a Wald test.

POWER ANALYSIS
Anticipating a small effect size, Power analysis for a logistic regression was conducted using the guidelines
established in Lipsey & Wilson, (2001) and G*Power 3.1.7 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2013) to
determine a sufficient sample size using an alpha of 0.05, a power of 0.80, a small effect size (odd ratio
= 1.2) and two-tailed test. Based on the assumptions, the desired sample size is 1484(Lipsey, 1990) .
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Table 2: Data Analysis Matrix
AIM

HYPOTHESES

ANALYSIS

PRIMARY
OUTCOME

PRIMARY
PREDICTORS

ANALYTICAL PREMISE

AIM 1: To verify the
presence of an
innovator first-mover
(or pioneer) advantage
and quantify its impact
on physician preferences
in a multisource drug
market

Longer periods of
innovator market
exclusivity bestow a
first-mover (pioneering)
competitive advantage
to the innovator drug
upon generic entry.

Logistic
regression

Likelihood of
Prescribing an
Innovator Drug

MODEL 1
• Innovator Price
Premium
• Innovator Monopoly
Period
• Generic Availability
Period

Monopoly protections granted by patents favour the
innovator drug long after the removal of competitive
barriers (a pioneering advantage).

AIM 2: To delineate the
process generic drug
acceptance among
physicians

Physicians will initially
overestimate the quality
differential between an
innovator drug and a
generic entrant

Logistic
Regression

MODEL 2
• Information
Differential
• Innovator Price
premium

Newer generics need time to establish their therapeutic
credentials (i.e. build their own brand equity) relative to
those of the innovator. Therefore, physicians will initially
overestimate quality differentials between innovator
drugs and newer generics but arrive at the true (smaller)
quality differential with time and experience.

The quality differential
between an innovator
and its bioequivalent
generic will diminish
over time.

Likelihood of
Prescribing an
Innovator Drug

If innovator drugs have a competitive advantage, we
expect:
1. Longer innovator monopoly periods associated with
greater likelihood of prescribing the innovator drug
2. Longer innovator monopoly periods strongly
correlated with sustained innovator price premiums
in a multisource drug market
3. Generic Availability period may attenuate the effect
size of Price premiums and Monopoly periods

If there is evidence of time-dependent information
diffusion for generic drugs, we expect:
1. New generics have large consensus quality
differentials; older generics have small consensus
quality differentials.
2. The innovator price premium will diminish over time
to reflect revisions in quality differentials
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AIM

HYPOTHESES

ANALYSIS

PRIMARY
OUTCOME

PRIMARY
PREDICTORS

ANALYTICAL PREMISE

AIM 3: To examine the
role of insurance
coverage in qualifying
physician brand loyalty

Moral hazard alters
brand equity
preferences

Logistic
regression

Likelihood of
Prescribing an
Innovator Drug

Model 3
• Insurance Type
• Innovator Price
Premium
• Innovator Price
Premium *
Insurance Type
interactive variable
• Innovator Monopoly
Period
• Generic Availability
Period

Moral hazard and other restrictions (e.g. formulary
allowances, co-pay) associated with third party payers
will change the magnitude of effect associated with
brand equity.

COVARIATES FOR ALL
MODELS

If there is evidence of moral hazard, we expect:
1. An increased likelihood of prescribing an innovator
drug for patients with private insurance particularly
where a significant price differential exists
2. A decreased likelihood of prescribing an innovator
drug for patients without insurance coverage
3. Adding insurance variables will decrease the effect
sizes associated with price premiums, market exclusivity,
and consensus quality differentials on prescribing
preferences

• Physician characteristics
• Practice Characteristics
• Patient Characteristics
• Drug Controls
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RESULTS
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Following the inclusion and exclusion criteria specified in our study design we selected
the top 6 multisource drugs in the sample based on first drug mentions. The specified drug
sample is depicted in Appendix A. The breakdown of innovator / generic binary decisions by
physicians in our sample are depicted in Table 3. There are 143,081 prescriptions or drug
mentions in the combined 2015 and 2016 data set. Of these, our drug sample comprises 7.4%
of all prescriptions (10648 drug mentions). Notably there is a high generic substitution rate of
72%, a marked increase when compared to analysis of the generic prescription rate in
previous years. For example, Hellerstein (1998) looked at the 1989 NAMCS and noticed only
about a 30% generic substitution rate.
As specified in the proposed study design, the unit of analysis is the physician-patient
encounter. The larger data set includes 41,497 total patient visits of which 98% are with a
physician. A prescription is dispensed in 72% of these physician-patient encounters (Table 5).
Overall, there are 8072 Physicians in the data set though only 12.5% write a prescription
involving any of the 6 drugs in our sample (Figure 4).
Furthermore, most patients in the sample are over the age of 45 (91%), have seen the
physician before (85%) and have at least one chronic condition (90%). Regarding expected
source of payment, 36% of patients in the sample have private insurance coverage and 47%
have Medicare. Other insurance categories are relatively uncommon (Table 4).
95% of physician prescribers included in the analysis are Doctors of Medicine, while 5%
are Doctors of Osteopathy. Prescriptions of the 6 drugs of interest are roughly distributed
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equally between primary, medical and surgical specialties. 74% of prescriptions are
prescribed by physicians operating in individual or physician group practices. Additionally,
42% of prescriptions in the sample are prescribed by physicians operating in the Midwest
(Table 5).
Table 3: Distribution of Prescription Decisions by Drug
VERSION OF
DRUG
PRESCRIBED
No. GENERIC
PRESCRIPTIONS
No. OF
INNOVATOR
PRESCRIPTIONS
TOTAL DRUG
MENTIONS

DRUG
AMLODIPINE

ATORVASTATIN

AMOXICILLIN

LISINOPRIL

LEVOTHYROXINE

ALPRAZOLAM

TOTAL

1340

1338

567

2416

1590

405

417

1040

64

87

819

565

7656
(72%)
2992
(28%)

1757
(16.5%)

2378
(22%)

631
(6%)

2503
(23.5%)

2409
(23%)

970
(9%)

10,648

67

Table 4: Prescription Choice by Patient Characteristics
PATIENT
CHARACTERISTICS
RACE
→White

VERSION OF DRUG PRESCRIBED
No. OF GENERIC
No. OF INNOVATOR
PRESCRIPTIONS
PRESCRIPTIONS
5978
(56%)
745
(7%)
651
(6%)
282
(3%)

2488
(23%)
231
(2%)
191
(2%)
82
(1%)

289
(3%)
83
(0.8%)
498
(5%)
2530
(24%)
2140
(20%)
2116
(20%)

52
(0.5%)
38
(0.4%)
270
(2.5%)
1034
(10%)
813
(8%)
785
(7%)

3650
(34%)
4006
(38%)

1211
(11%)
1781
(17%)

1198
(11%)
6458
(61%)

449
(4%)
2543
(24%)

6559
(62%)
1040
(10%)

2495
(23%)
471
(5%)

2737
(26%)

1076
(10%)

Medicare

3637
(34%)

1397
(13%)

Medicaid

660
(6%)

214
(2%)

→Black
→Hispanic
→ Other
AGE
Under 15 years
15-24 years
25-44 years
45-64 years
65-74 years
75 + years
GENDER
Male
Female
NEW PATIENT
Yes
No
(Established Patients)
CHRONIC CONDITION
Yes
No
INSURANCE
Private
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PATIENT
CHARACTERISTICS

VERSION OF DRUG PRESCRIBED
No. OF GENERIC
No. OF INNOVATOR
PRESCRIPTIONS
PRESCRIPTIONS

Workers’ Compensation

23
(0.2%)

6
(0.05%)

Self

126
(1%)

61
(0.6%)

Other

73
(0.7%)

25
(0.2%)

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
Total number of drug mentions
Generic prescription rate
Innovator prescription rate

10,648
72%
28%

Figure 4: Summary of Physician-Patient Encounters

UNIT OF ANALYSIS – Physician – Patient Encounter

PHYSICIANS
• 8072 Physicians in the data set (~ 12.5% included in the analysis )
• Participants in NAMCS are asked to provide data on approximately 30
patient visits during a randomly-assigned, 1-week reporting period.
• 95% MD and 5% DO
PATIENT VISITS
• 41,497 total patient visits
• 40,847 of these patient visits are with a physician
• 29,680 total patient encounters involve a prescription
DRUGS
• 143,081 prescriptions (or drug mentions)
• 10,648 (7.4%) prescriptions involving sample drugs
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Table 5: Prescription Choice by Physician and Practice Characteristics
PHYSICIAN AND PRACTICE
CHARACTERISTICS
SPECIALTY
Primary Care

VERSION OF DRUG PRESCRIBED
No. OF GENERIC
No. OF INNOVATOR
PRESCRIPTIONS
PRESCRIPTIONS
2452
(23%)
2862
(27%)
2252
(21%)

940
(8%)
1106
(10%)
946
(9%)

5763
(54%)
905
(9%)
775
(7%)

2161
(20%)
312
(3%)
383
(4%)

1216
(11%)

542
(5%)

Midwest

2190
(21%)

1192
(11%)

South

2181
(20%)

649
(6%)

West

2069
(19%)

609
(6%)

Surgical Care
Medical Care
OWNER
PHYSICIAN SOLO OR GROUP
PRACTICE
MEDICAL/ ACADEMIC HEALTH
CENTRE
HOSPITAL
REGION
Northeast

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
Total number of drug
mentions
Generic prescription rate
Innovator prescription rate

10,648
72%
28%

70

MARGINAL EFFECTS
Table 6: Average Marginal Effects of Logistic Regression
PROB (Y=INNOVATOR)

MODEL 1
MARGINAL
EFFECT

MODEL 2
SE

MARGINAL
EFFECT

SE

MODEL 3
MARGINAL
EFFECT

SE

BRAND EQUITY PRIMARY PREDICTORS
INNOVATOR MONOPOLY
DURATION
YEARS OF GENERIC
AVAILABILITY
GENERIC AVAILABILITY
RATIO
PRICE PREMIUM

0.0141 ***

0.002

_______

_______

0.0094 ***

0.001

_______

- 0.0022 ***

0.001

_______

_______

_______

_______

_______

- 0.1467 ***

0.014

- 0.3876 ***

0.009

- 0.3222 ***

0.015

- 0.3480 ***

0.012

_______

_______

PRESCRIPTION CHARACTERISTICS
NUMBER OF MEDICATIONS

0.0009

0.001

0.0002

0.001

- 0.0001

0.001

CONTINUED MEDICATION

0.0001

0.012

0.0233 **

0.010

- 0.0006

0.009

NO USE OF ELECTRONIC
PRESCRIBING
DRUG DUMMYS

0.0279 *

0.015

0.0275 *

0.014

LISINOPRIL

0.0233 *

0.012

- 0.0246 ***

0.008

- 0.0408 ***

0.009

- 0.0169 ***

0.008

0.0273 ***

0.005

0.0435 ***

0.006

0.0154 ***

0.005

- 0.0500 ***

0.009

0.0329 ***

0.005

- 0.0259 ***

0.009

0.0829 ***

0.011

0.1256 ***

0.013

0.0829 ***

0.011

- 0.0003

0.0062

- 0.0734 ***

0.011

SURGICAL CARE SPECIALTY

0.0022

0.008

0.0128

0.008

0.0045

0.062

MEDICAL CARE SPECIALTY

0.0019

0.008

0.0155

0.008

0.0042

0.061

D.O – DOCTOR OF
OSTEOPATHY

0.0067

0.010

0.0093

0.011

0.0069

0.008

AMLODIPINE
LEVOTHYROXINE
ALPRAZOLAM
ATORVASTATIN

- 0.0003 **

0.0062

PHYSICIAN VARIABLES

PRACTICE VARIABLES
OWNER =
MEDICAL/ACADEMIC
HEALTH CENTER; HOSPITAL
OWNER= INSURANCE
COMPANY, HEALTH PLAN,
OR HMO
SOLO PRACTICE

0.0042

0.011

0.0064

0.011

0.0066

0.009

0.0139 *

0.011

0.0160*

0.012

0.0199 **

0.010

0.0020

0.007

0.0049

0.007

0.0037

0.006

MIDWEST

0.0116 *

0.008

0.0138*

0.009

0.0170 ***

0.007

SOUTH

0.0034

0.009

- 0.0043

0.009

0.0036

0.007

WEST

- 0.0204

0.010

- 0.0234

0.011

- 0.0118

0.008
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PROB (Y=INNOVATOR)

NON-MSA

MODEL 1
MARGINAL
EFFECT
- 0.0012

MODEL 2
SE

0.011

MARGINAL
EFFECT
0.0064

SE
0.012

MODEL 3
MARGINAL
EFFECT
- 0.0026

SE
0.008

PATIENT DEMOGRAPHICS
AGE

0.0001

0.001

0.0003

0.001

-0.0001

0.001

MALE

- 0.0072

0.004

- 0.0092

0.005

- 0.0072

0.004

RACE =BLACK

- 0.0056

0.008

- 0.0034

0.008

- 0.0054

0.006

RACE = HISPANIC

0.0008

0.010

0.0081

0.010

0.0043

0.009

RACE = OTHER

- 0.0087

0.012

- 0.0087

0.013

- 0.0024

0.010

NEW PATIENT

0.0020

0.006

0.0027

0.006

0.0004

0.005

- 0.0130

0.009

- 0.0080

0.008

- 0.0050

0.006

CHRONIC CONDITION

PATIENT INSURANCE
MEDICARE

0.0012

0.005

- 0.0034

0.005

0.0011

0.005

MEDICAID

0.0034

0.012

- 0.0012

0.012

0.0034

0.013

- 0.0041

0.018

0.0039

0.023

- 0.0031

0.014

SELF

0.015

0.014

0.0189

0.014

0.014

0.016

OTHER

0.015

0.018

0.0111

0.018

0.015

0.018

PSEUDO R2

0.6886

WORKER’S COMPENSATION

LOG LIKELIHOOD
OBSERVATIONS
NUMBER OF PHYSICIAN
CLUSTERS
PREDICTIONS CORRECTLY
CLASSIFIED

-1730.8519
9459
1102
97.90%

0.6696
-1836.6456
9459

0.6910
-1828.2494
1012

1102

1143

96.54%

97.85%

Note 1: ***, ** and * are significant at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively
Note 2: Standard Errors based on Physician clusters
Note 3: Reference Variables – New medications, Use of electronic prescribing, Amoxicillin, Primary Care Specialty,
M.D., Physician or Physician Group, Non-Solo Practice, Northeast, MSA, Female, White, Established Patient, No
Chronic Conditions, Private Insurance
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SUMMARY OF RESULTS
To analyse the influence of brand equity on physician’s decision to prescribe a generic
or innovator drug, a logit model that considers the effect of physician clustering is estimated.
By controlling for the physician clustering effect, each physician cluster is used as the unit of
observation instead of treating each individual patient office visit as the unit of observation
(Pepper, 2002; Wooldridge 2003; Rice, 2011). The estimated standard errors are then robust
and provide unbiased statistical inferences. The estimates are presented in Table 6. Our
analysis incorporates several indicators of brand equity: 1)brand equity defined as the price
premium between an innovator drug and its generic successor; 2) brand equity is evidenced
by brand loyalty and habit persistence, that is, the increased likelihood of prescribing an
innovator drug in a multisource drug market; and 3) Brand equity is quantified as the
perceived consensus quality differential between an innovator drug and generic substitutes.
BRAND EQUITY PREDICTORS
Innovator Monopoly duration
In the first model, the coefficient for innovator monopoly duration is positive and
significant, which confirms our stated hypotheses : The longer an innovator has a monopoly
in the market, the more likely it is that the innovator will be prescribed over its generic
successors in subsequent multisource markets. In the first model, each year of prior innovator
monopoly is associated with a 1.4% greater likelihood that physicians in the sample prescribe
the innovator over other generic substitutes.

Accordingly, we corroborate our first

hypothesis that an innovator drug with a long period of market exclusivity has a first-mover
advantage in subsequent multisource markets. The positive and significant coefficient for
innovator monopoly duration, confirms that this first-mover advantage is extra time with
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which to cultivate brand equity and form a loyal customer base. The result of brand loyalty is
that physicians in a multisource market are more likely to opt for the established innovator
over newer bioequivalent generic substitutes.
Generic Availability
Notably, the first model does not account for the length of generic availability. Indeed,
when the duration of generic availability is accounted for in model 3, the average marginal
effect of innovator monopoly diminishes though remains statistically significant - each year
of prior innovator monopoly is associated with a 0.94% greater likelihood of prescribing the
innovator version of the drug.
Indeed, a generic availability ratio with a significantly negative coefficient in model 2
conforms with expectations – the longer a generic is available on the market the more likely
it is to be prescribed in generic form as the length of market availability increases. In our
sample, physicians are 15% less likely to prescribe the innovator the longer the length of
generic availability increases. In model 3, it is notable that a single year of generic availability
is associated with a small (0.2%) but significant decrease in the likelihood of prescribing a drug
in its innovator form.
The generic availability ratio pits the duration of generic availability against the
duration of innovator availability (pre- and post-patent) in the market. Accordingly, this
availability ratio is a proxy that can intuitively be understood as the consensus among
physicians as to the quality difference between an innovator and its generic successors. We
hypothesised that the medical community is risk-averse with a new and untested generic and
will significantly overestimate the difference in quality between the novel generic and the
established innovator incumbent. However, with experience and time, physicians’ quality
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perceptions are revised and the perceived difference in quality between the innovator
incumbent and generic substitute diminishes. This hypothesis is confirmed by a significantly
negative marginal effect for the generic availability ratio. This signifies that the longer a
generic is available on the market relative to the innovator incumbent’s time on the market,
the more likely the generic will be prescribed over the innovator.
Price Premium
The price premium variable is measured as the natural log of the ratio of innovator
price to generic price. In all three models, the coefficient of the logistic regression is negative
and significant. Estimations of average marginal effect suggest that physicians in our sample
are between 32 to 38 percent less likely to prescribe a drug in its innovator form as the relative
price of the innovator increases.
Previous studies often exclude drug prices from the empirical analysis because of the
assumption that physicians do not account for cost effectiveness in their prescription decision
and are, furthermore, unaware of actual drug prices (Temin, 1980). By including the price
premium ratio in our models, we assert that while physicians may be unaware of exact price
points, they do acknowledge relative differences in price especially when the differences
between alternatives are large. The negative and very significant regressors for the price
premium variable in the three models suggests that physicians are price sensitive. As the
innovator-generic price differential increases, physicians are less likely to prescribe the
innovator over its less expensive generic substitutes.
While this result validates the notion of a price sensitive physician it does however
reveal the limits of brand equity in our sample of physicians. One tenet of brand equity is that
demand for the brand exists despite and even because of a price premium. The incremental
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price difference signifies a perceived difference in quality between the brand and its
substitutes. As a financial construct, brand equity is represented by the price premium
patients are willing to pay for an innovator drug over and above that of the bioequivalent
generic. Yet as agents to the principal patient, physicians in our sample are unwilling to
accommodate the price premium associated with the innovator. Instead they opt for the
cheaper generic. While physicians in our sample are loyal to an innovator drug with a long
monopoly, this brand loyalty does not extend to a willingness to accommodate a price
premium.
PRESCRIPTION AND DRUG CHARACTERISTICS
Prescription Characteristics
The estimated effect of a patient being prescribed more than one medication is small
and insignificant. This variable is included in the model to reduce correlation across
prescriptions written for the same patient. Based on this result, dropping the variable from
the model would barely affect the other estimates and it is doubtful that an estimator that
accounts for clustering of prescription by patients is needed.
A significant finding in all three models is the impact of electronic prescribing. It is
notable that physicians who do not use electronic prescribing are more likely to prescribe the
innovator version of a drug than those who do use electronic prescribing and that this
difference is significant. Moreover, the variable for electronic prescribing is highly correlated
to a separate variable determining the use of computerised systems to perform drug
formulary checks. However, preliminary regression including both variables resulted in one
of these variables being dropped from the model due to near perfect multicollinearity. This
suggests that in our sample of physicians, those who do use electronic prescribing also have
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a tendency or at least the capability to perform drug formulary checks, which may explain
their inclination to consider more cost-effective generic options.
Drug Dummies
The coefficients estimated for drug dummies in all 3 logistic regressions are
remarkably large and highly statistically significant. There is considerable variation in
innovator prescribing across individual drugs. Perceptibly, individual drug dummies account
for a considerable share of the models’ explanatory power and when these regressors are
dropped from the model, the probability of specification error is increased. Drug
characteristics strongly influence the decision to prescribe either the innovator incumbent or
generic substitute. Observed drug characteristics are the same for all physicians in the sample,
so any degree of variation in innovator prescribing rates across drugs is an indication that
physicians perceive drug attribute differently.
The significant explanatory power of drug dummy variables in all three models
supports the notion that physician behaviour is largely explained by habit persistence as
argued in previous literature including Hellerstein (1998), Howard (1997) and Nayak (2013).
Physicians in our sample tend to prescribe the same form (generic or innovator) of a drug to
every patient regardless of patient characteristics.
PHYSICIAN AND PRACTICE VARIABLES
In all three models, while specialty and training bear no influence on the binary
prescription decision, certain practice characteristics do influence which version of a drug is
prescribed. Physicians practicing in the Mid-West are at a 10% level of statistical significance
between 12% -17% more likely to choose an innovator drug than the reference group of
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physicians practicing in the North East. Physicians in the West are consistently less likely to
prescribe innovator drugs than the reference group of physicians practicing in the North East,
though the difference is not statistically significant.

Contrary to stated expectations,

physicians working at practices owned by an insurance company, health plan, or HMO are
between 14% and 19% more likely to prescribe the innovator version of a drug than physicians
working in individual or physician group practices.
As is the case with the generic availability ratio, these findings further bolster our
second hypothesis of their being a process of information diffusion and consensus building
among physicians about a drug’s quality.

The implication is that physicians with

characteristics in common share information about the efficacy of individual drugs and that a
consensus is formed within groups of associating physicians (be it by region or practice)
regarding the efficacy of innovator incumbent versus its generic successors.
PATIENT DEMOGRAPHICS
In all models, the coefficients of patient demographic variables are small and not
statistically significant.

Though not statistically significant, the direction of regressors

suggests that patients with chronic conditions may be less likely to receive the innovator
compared to patients with no chronic conditions. Also, new patients may be more likely to
receive innovator drugs than established patients. Previous literature (Nayak, 2013) have
found these two variables to be statistically significant. Notwithstanding, patient
demographics and traits do not appear to influence the prescription decision.
Nonetheless, small non-significant patient demographic regressors in conjunction
with the highly statistically significant drug dummy variables hints again at habit persistence.
My results imply that physicians do not consider patient profiles when making prescription
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decisions. Instead, physicians in our sample are making the choice between an innovator or
generic substitute based on ingrained pharmacological judgements rather than varying
prescriptions according to patient characteristics. Thus, every patient in the physician’s
cluster is prescribed the same form (generic or innovator) of a drug regardless of individual
differences.
PATIENT INSURANCE
Using ordinary least squares, the regressor for no charge/ charity patients is negative,
large, and significant. This implies that patients in this no charge category are significantly less
likely than patients with private insurance to receive an innovator drug. However, as the
no/charity parameter perfectly predicts failure (that is, all patients in this category receive a
generic drug), it is dropped from the estimation of the logistic regression.
The remaining regressors for insurance variables are not statistically significant and
are small relative to their standard errors. We conducted a Wald test to evaluate the
difference between nested models to determine if insurance parameters were
simultaneously equal to zero. The squared value generated by the Wald test was 1.39 with
five degrees of freedom. Based on the p-value of 0.9253 we fail to reject the null hypothesis,
indicating that insurance coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. Including insurance
variables does not improve the fit of the model. Thus, in the interests of parsimony we would
be justified in dropping insurance coefficients all together. However, in the literature there is
compelling evidence that patient insurance status significantly impacts prescription decisions.
This is in part supported by the excluded variable of no charge/charity patients, which
perfectly predicts the failure condition in our model, that is, the prescribing of a generic.
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Therefore, as this is a hypothesis driven model, we have chosen to keep insurance variables
in our final model.
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DISCUSSION
THE CONCEPTUAL THEORY
In this dissertation, we propose that the most salient factor influencing physician
behaviour is brand equity, which is both a monetary and qualitative construct. As a financial
construct, brand equity is represented by the price premium patients are willing to pay for an
innovator drug over and above that of the bioequivalent generic. As a qualitative construct,
brand equity represents a gradation of superlative, yet subjective characteristics possessed
by the innovator drug versus its generic substitutes. Consistent with the marketing literature
(Aaker, 1996; Keller, 1993; Keller 2001), these psychological attributes include greater
awareness and knowledge of the innovator drug, positive associations with the innovator
brand, and perceived quality of the innovator drug (often viewed as superior to the
bioequivalent generic substitute). The result of this continuum of attitudinal change is
entrenched brand loyalty to the innovator and habit persistence, a psychological attribute
that can be quantitatively assessed by calculating the likelihood of prescribing the innovator
drug over its generic successor.
Given these monetary and qualitative descriptors, our analysis incorporated several
indicators of brand equity: 1)brand equity defined as the price premium between an innovator
drug and its generic successor; 2) brand equity quantified by the increased likelihood of
prescribing an innovator drug in a multisource drug market; and 3) Brand equity quantified
as the perceived consensus quality differential between an innovator drug and generic
substitute.
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THE STUDY OBJECTIVES
The overarching goal of this dissertation was to ascertain whether brand equity
influences prescriber preferences between innovator (brand) drugs and generic alternatives
and if third party payers can override such preferences. As such, our first aim was to establish
whether innovator drugs have a first-mover advantage over generic successors in multisource
markets. Conversely, our second aim was to determine whether upon the removal of barriers
to entry, generics can catch up with the pioneering advantages of the innovator. By so doing,
our objective was to delineate the process of generic drug acceptance (including learning and
switching behaviour) among physician prescribers. The final aim was to examine the role of
insurance status in qualifying physician brand loyalty.
EXPECTED FINDINGS VS MODEL RESULTS
In keeping with the first aim, we hypothesised that longer periods of innovator market
exclusivity bestow a first-mover competitive advantage to the innovator drug in subsequent
multisource markets. We expected that longer periods of innovator market exclusivity are
associated with a greater likelihood of innovator prescriptions once the market is open to
competition from generics. Additionally, we predicted that the first mover advantage results
in a greater likelihood of prescription despite their being a sustained price difference between
the innovator and its generic substitutes. The results of the analysis partially corroborate the
first hypothesis. Indeed, an innovator drug with a long period of market exclusivity has the
first-mover advantage of brand loyalty in subsequent multisource markets. A long period of
market exclusivity is associated with a greater likelihood of prescribing a drug in its innovator
form. However, while physicians are price sensitive, they are less likely rather than more likely
to prescribe an innovator drug with a substantial price premium.
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The second hypothesis states that physicians will initially overestimate the perceived
relative therapeutic benefit between an innovator drug and a generic entrant. This consensus
quality differential between an innovator and its bioequivalent generic we expected to
diminish over time as physicians familiarised themselves with the generic. The results fully
support this second hypothesis. The longer a generic is available on the market relative to the
innovator incumbent’s time on the market, the more likely the generic will be prescribed over
the innovator. Accordingly, the results delineate a process of time-dependent information
diffusion and generic drug acceptance. The length of generic availability facilitates prescriber
learning and switching behaviour from innovator to generic. Our results also intimate a
process of consensus building among associating physicians within the same region or
practice type.
Finally, the third hypothesis asserts that insurance status will override the brand
equity preferences of physicians. As innovator drugs tend to be more expensive than ensuing
generics, we hypothesised that patients in my reference category of uninsured or self-pay
patients will be least likely to receive branded innovator drugs, which is evidence of moral
hazard (Lundin, 2000; Nayak, 2013). Consistent with the literature, we also expected fewer
innovator drug prescriptions to be dispensed to patients enrolled in public health insurance
schemes such as Medicaid and Medicare (Rice, 2011), and cost containment payer systems
such as Health Maintenance Organisations (HMOs) (Nayak, 2013; Thier, 2011). However, our
analysis does not affirm this hypothesis. On the contrary, insurance variables individually and
jointly have no impact on the prescription decision between generic and innovator
alternatives. While physicians are price sensitive, there is no evidence that physicians are
more responsive to the costs borne by patients than costs incurred by third-party payers.
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IMPLICATIONS
Substantiating the existence of prescriber-based brand equity explains why health
care payers and consumers alike are failing to realise the cost savings of a competitive offpatent drug market despite bioequivalency data, favourable generic substitution policies, and
pressure from payers to minimise cost. Various elements of our proposed analysis intimate
possible remedies. Given that extended innovator monopoly is found to significantly favour
prescribing of the innovator over ensuing generics, it behoves policy makers to reconsider
brand patent extensions as a means of strategic entry deterrence with far-reaching
consequence. That extended innovator market exclusivity becomes a first-mover advantage
evident in prescriber loyalty in subsequent multisource drug markets infers that innovating
firms are incentivised to protect and capitalise on this head start.
Conversely, it is evident that new generic competitors face the prospect of overcoming
physicians’ knowledge gap and developing trust as physicians trial the new generic
alternatives. By building their own equity, new generic entrants bridge prescribers’ perceived
quality differentiation between the innovator incumbent and novel generic options. If indeed
innovator drugs have a head start on subsequent generics, it stands to reason that generics
could eventually bridge this gap. Time confers generic substitutes the opportunity to build
their own “equity”, as physicians familiarise themselves with the drug. As per Aaker’s model
– product awareness and perceived quality are essential contributors to brand equity(Aaker,
1991). Accordingly, physicians will more readily switch to older generics but remain loyal to
the innovator drug (i.e. habit persistence) in the case of newer generics. This process of timedependent information diffusion is borne by the literature (Howard, 1997).
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Other notable findings include the tendency of physicians to prescribe the same
version of a drug to all patients regardless of their demographics or medical profile.
Hellerstein (1998), labels this inclination among prescribers as “habit persistence”. Yet the
implementation of certain nudges may discourage habitual prescribing and instead
encourage switching behaviour towards more cost-effective generic alternatives. One
strategy implied by the results is the universal implementation of electronic prescribing using
default options to increase generic medication prescribing rates. The efficacy of this
behavioural nudge is borne out by the literature : In a pilot study (Patel et al, 2014) of internal
medicine practices at Penn Medicine, researchers found that changes to medical display
defaults in the electronic health record resulted in higher rates of generic prescribing. After
reviewing these findings, default settings were further refined and then launched throughout
all practices among all specialties at Penn Medicine. Before the intervention, the generic
prescribing rate at Penn Medicine was steadily hovering around 75%. Immediately after the
change in defaults, the generic prescribing rate increased to 98.4% (Patel et al, 2014).
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CONCLUSION
SUMMARY
The goal of this dissertation is to understand the influence of brand equity on the
physician prescriber decision-making process. We determine that brand equity is critically
important for physician prescribers to make points of differentiation between innovator
branded drugs and their generic alternatives. We establish that time is a critical factor in
cultivating brand equity thereby influencing prescriber choice. For innovator drugs, we find
that extended periods of market exclusivity result in an increased likelihood of prescribing the
innovator once the market is open to competition from generics. Conversely, we also
determine the likelihood of switching to the generic in multisource drug markets. In weighing
physician loyalty to the innovator (habit persistence) against the physician’s propensity to
switch to the generic (switching behaviour), we examine how consensus perceived quality
estimations between innovator and generic are revised over time and how such
differentiation is reflected in prescriber habits. Finally, we determine that while the physician
is price sensitive, they do not vary their prescription decision based on insurance status.
LIMITATIONS
Of note, our sample frame – The National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS)
– is limited to non-federally employed office-based physicians who are primarily engaged in
direct patient care. Accordingly, results of our analysis have limited generalisability to
inpatient care settings. Furthermore, the pooled cross-sectional design of the NAMCS survey
hinders the possibility of examining individual preferences over time. To fully portray the
impact of brand equity and moral hazard on prescriber practice, one would ideally like to
observe a physician repeatedly prescribe the same drug over an extended period. Analysing
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longitudinal data would better render a more accurate estimation of switching behaviour and
habit persistence.
Moreover, the analysis hinges on drug mentions. It is important to reiterate that
medications ordered by the physician are not necessarily the medications ultimately
dispensed to the patient by the pharmacist. Barring physician injunction, the pharmacist has
leeway to substitute an innovator for a generic or vice versa. Generally, because of pricing
considerations and formulary restrictions, dispensing rates of generic drugs are higher than
prescribing rates (Nayak, 2013). The effect of such discretionary changeover is to de-link the
physician’s prescription decision from what is dispensed. Without a data set that links the
prescribing habits of physicians to pharmacist substitutions, it is difficult to extrapolate and
quantify the influence that prescription habits exert on healthcare costs (Nayak, 2013).
Nevertheless, as our research question focuses on the physician prescription order
rather than the execution of it, discrepancies between prescriber choice and end-user
practice do not impact the validity or accuracy of our conclusions. Relevance is still maintained
because despite generic substitution policy, innovator dominance in the marketplace -both
in pricing and volume- remains a current and intractable issue for policy makers and insurers
alike. Hence an empirical analysis of prescriber habits and brand preferences would better
elucidate the origins of this paradox.
Finally, our analysis includes no controls for advertising and marketing efforts, which
could potentially influence prescriber choice.

Therefore, we cannot assess how the

promotion of the innovator brand or generic alternative bridges the physician knowledge gap
or impacts perceived therapeutic equivalence. Appreciably, a well strategised marketing
campaign eases the path towards strong brand identity or, in the case of the generic, counters
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any potential first mover advantage of the incumbent. As an accurate measure of effort is
difficult to construe, we have instead chosen to substitute effort with time. We include time
variables such as the innovator monopoly period and the generic availability ratio asserting
that, ceteris paribus, brand equity is a function of market presence.
AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Many authors have studied the binary prescription decision between an innovator
drug and a generic substitute. They separately examined the impact of monopoly, price, and
insurance status on prescriber behaviour. Indeed, some such as Hellerstein (1998) noted
elements of habit persistence and brand loyalty among physician prescribers. Yet these
observations, though repeated in the literature, were curious but incidental findings in the
larger exploration of pharmaceutical demand.
My contribution to the literature is to streamline these overlooked behavioural
eccentricities by appropriating the concept of brand equity from marketing theory and
applying it to the novel context of prescriber choice. Future research could delve into other
aspects of brand equity, such as the influence of brand salience (name recognition and recall)
and marketing, on prescriber choice. To better conceptualise prescriber learning and
switching behaviours, prospective research could investigate the synergy between generic
options. This could include an assessment of how switching behaviour alters based on generic
order of entry and the number of generic competitors. Additionally, by varying and expanding
the array of drug choices and therapeutic classes, one could better understand the extent to
which a drug’s idiosyncrasies (such as narrow therapeutic index) promote either brand loyalty
or switching behaviour. Moreover, in expanding the scope of drugs and number of physicians
in the study, one could re-examine the effect of insurance status on prescribers’ brand loyalty.
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Finally, there is an exciting avenue of behavioural economic research, including the role of
behavioural nudges (such as default generic prescriptions), Bayesian updating, and heuristics,
in determining prescriber brand preferences.
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APPENDIX
Appendix 1: Drug Sample
CHEMICAL NAME OF
DRUG
Amlodipine

VERSIONS

BROAD THERAPEUTIC
CLASS
Cardiovascular agent

MARKETING DATE
(ordered)
31 July 1992
3 October 2005

Atorvastatin

Lipitor*
Atorvastatin

Metabolic agent

17 Dec 1996
30 November 2011

Amoxicillin

Amoxil*
Trimox
Amoxicillin

Anti-infective

1 January 1982
1 January 1982
1 January 1982

Lisinopril

Prinivil*
Zestril
Lisinopril

Cardiovascular agent

29 December 1987
19 May 1988
1 July 2002

Alprazolam

Xanax *
Alprazolam
Xanax XR*
Niravam

CNS Agent

1 January 1982
19 October 2003
17 January 2003
19 January 2005

LEVOTHYROXINE
SODIUM

Synthroid

Hormones

1 January 1982

Norvasc*
Amlodipine

Unithroid
Levoxyl
Levothyroxine Sodium
Levothroid (thyrotabs)
Tirosint

21 August 2000
25 May 2001
5 June 2002
24 October 2002
13 October 2006

*Innovator designation

Of note, the innovator designation is given to the first version of the drug to be marketed and
generic designation to all bioequivalent successors be they branded or otherwise.

Per this

classification, the innovator drug is usually but not always the Reference Listed Drug (RLD)3.
Additionally, marketing dates for drugs approved prior to 1982 are top coded at 1 January 1982 as per
the FDA orange book convention.

3

A Reference Listed Drug (RLD) is an approved drug product to which new generic versions are compared to
show that they are bioequivalent. A drug company seeking approval to market a generic equivalent must refer
to the Reference Listed Drug in its Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA).
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